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ABSTRACT
A Study of Household Finance in China
by
HUANG Zhen
Doctor of Philosophy

The emerging field of household finance, which studies the welfare benefits of
financial markets for households and how effectively households use this market, is
of significant importance for both academics and policy makers. However, studies in
this new field remain scarce. Using data from a national representative survey that
is unique for its combination of abundant household characteristics and
heterogeneous individual preferences, attitudes and believes, and for its inclusion of
investment behaviour and performances, this thesis pioneers a positive household
finance study in developing countries by systematically investigating Chinese
householders’ investments in the stock market. Moreover, this is the first study to
regard the psychological concept of ‘trait anxiety’ (which refers to a person’s
inherent propensity to feel anxious) as negatively associated with stock investment
return performance.
This thesis comprises three main studies. In the first study, I investigate the reasons
households participate in the stock market. I find that the evidence from China is
systematically consistent with previous studies, which mainly focus on developed
countries. That is, the poor and the less educated are less likely to hold equity in their
final portfolios; and variables reflecting cost, constraint, preference and expectation
play a statistically significant role in stock market participation. I also investigate the
stock market participation problem from the new perspective of job satisfaction.
Discontentment with one’s job, especially on job salary motivates stock investment
activity. Satisfaction with hours of work and job stability boosts the probability of
participation.
Individual investment performance plays an increasingly important role in household
wealth accumulation and financial well-being. Then in the second study I examine
the performance of the households that participate in the stock market. First, the
evidence from China on this issue is also consistent with that from developed
countries. Investors that are poor, less-educated and facing high information costs
underperform significantly. Moreover, two so-called ‘investor mistakes’ also
undermine stock investment outcomes in China. Second, I study investor
performance form a new angle, preference for information screening with respect to
resources, and find that investors who rely on their own analysis when making
trading decisions earn more. These investors are usually wealthier, have more
financial knowledge and are more likely to be male.
My third study further explores determinant of investment performance by
identifying a more fundamental, intrinsic and stable heterogeneity that is embedded

in human personality, i.e., trait anxiety, which reflects people’s innate propensity to
feel anxious. I find that investors who are more prone to anxiety have significantly
inferior investment performance in terms of stock market return rate, after
controlling for many other relevant factors. This finding is robust across investment
periods of both half a year and three years, and across regressions using different
proxies for trait anxiety.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Section 1. Research background
In his presidential address to the 2006 annual meeting of the American Finance
Association, Professor John Campbell (2006) defined household finance as a new
field of finance analogous to corporate finance, which asks ‘how households use
financial instruments to attain their objectives’. This new field is important for at
least two reasons. First, household investment outcomes are playing an increasingly
critical role in household wealth accumulation, which is one of the basic concerns of
economics. Due to equity premiums, the question of whether or not to invest in
stocks can, at least theoretically, make a substantial difference to household wealth in
the long run. Furthermore, some evidence shows that different outcomes in wealth
accumulation can further enlarge existing income inequalities. Second, household
investors’ behaviour in financial market affects asset pricing and consequently
determines market efficiency (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990;
Dumas, Kurshev, & Uppal, 2009). In this context, household finance has significant
implications for both academics and policy makers.

Like other fields, the study of household finance could be normative (i.e. to state
what households should do) or positive (i.e. to describe what households actually do).
Specifically, Campbell (2006) argues that the gap between normative household
finance and positive household finance is central to this field since there are some
large gaps between the theoretically ideal and observed actual financial behaviour of
households. Hence, more research is called for on both normative and positive
household investment. The standard theories claim that no matter how risk averse an
individual is, s/he should include at least some risky assets in her/his portfolio and
that an optimised stock portfolio should be fully diversified. In reality, substantial
proportion of households in any economies does not invest in stocks. The normative
theories therefore need to be extended to account for such a puzzle, which may be
related to problems associated with transaction costs, borrowing constraints, life-long
horizon and non-tradable and non-hedgable asset holdings. On the other hand,
although behavioural finance has revealed a number of individual behavioural biases,
1

we still know little about how realistic the theoretical assumptions of different
rational household investors are with respect to their financial investment behaviour.
This situation is mainly due to the scarcity of high quality data to test these
assumptions.

The field of household finance has developed considerably since Campbell’s address
to the American Finance Association 2006 annual meeting. Most importantly, in a
series of subsequent papers, (Campbell, 2006; Calvet, Campbell, & Sodini, 2009a;
Calvet, Campbell, & Sodini, 2009b; Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, & Tufano, 2011)
find that for a minority of households, particularly poor and less educated households,
their actual behavior diverge from theoretical optimal investment behaviour, with
potentially serious consequences. As these discrepancies are difficult to be
rationalised by controlling the small frictions that are ignored in standard financial
theory, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009b) labelled such discrepancies as investor
mistakes and constructed indexes to measure them. On the other hand, researchers
working in the field of behavioural finance have been paying increasing attention to
inherent individual heterogeneities that have universal predictive power for
household investment behavior and performance. More recent studies have identified
a variety of such heterogeneities, for instance, genetic makeup (Barnea, Cronqvist, &
Siegel, 2010; Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, Sandewall, & Wallace, 2010), IQ
(Grinblatt, Keloharju, & Linnainmaa, 2012), sociability and trust (Hong, Kubik, &
Stein, 2004; Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011).

Despite the above findings, household finance is still a very under-researched field.
For example, the majority of the existing empirical studies use data from developed
economies and relatively few studies examine developing economies. This also
applies to China, the world’s most populous country and second largest economy.
Thus far, few studies have systematically examined how Chinese households invest
in equity. In addition, it has long been established in psychology that personality
traits, which are stable and observable, can be used to predict human behaviour and
performance. However, economists have paid little attention to applying these
powerful theories of Personality Psychology in investment studies. This PhD thesis
aims to fill these research gaps.
2

Section 2. Main findings
This thesis comprises three interrelated studies. The most prominent division
between positive household finance and normative finance occurs with the so-called
‘stock market non-participation puzzle’: why is it that some Chinese households
participate in the domestic stock market and some refrain from doing so? I begin the
thesis by exploring this question from three perspectives. First, following a standard
approach (Campbell, 2006; Calvet, Campbell, & Sodini, 2009a; Calvet, Campbell, &
Sodini, 2009b; Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, & Tufano, 2011), I show that the
evidence from China is consistent with previous studies, which mainly focus on
developed countries. That is, the poor and the less educated are less likely to hold
equity in their financial portfolios, and variables reflecting cost, constraint,
preference and expectation play a statistically significant role in stock market
participation. Specifically, risk tolerance, wealth and financial knowledge stand out
as the three most economically significant drivers of stock investment. Second, I
investigate the stock market participation problem from the novel perspective of job
satisfaction. In general, discontentment with one’s job motivates stock investment
activity. Specifically, dissatisfaction with pay is the most influential aspect of job
satisfaction that boosts stock ownership. Satisfaction with hours of work reflects the
information cost in terms of opportunity cost, therefore increasing the probability of
an agent participating in the stock market. Moreover, job stability and security reflect
background risk exposure, and thus play a role in stock ownership decisions. Finally,
satisfaction with job stability and security are found to be positively correlated with
stock investment involvement.

Having established the determinants of stock market participation, it is natural to ask
which participants in the Chinese stock market are most successful. Therefore, in the
second study, I examine the performance of the households that participate in the
stock market. As predicted by standard theory, I find that variables reflecting investor
constraints influence individual stock investment performance. Evidence shows that
the more constraints an investor is subject to, the lower the return rate on his/ her
stock portfolio. The poor, the less-educated and investors with information
disadvantage are found to underperform significantly, which I argue is because these
investors bear higher information costs and consequently are more constrained.
3

Furthermore, two so-called ‘investor mistakes’ indeed undermine stock investment
outcomes, as predicted by current theory and often observed in the literature. Next, I
explore investor performance from a new angle – preference for information
screening with respect to resources – and find that investors who rely on their own
analysis when making trading decisions earn more. These investors are usually
wealthier, have more financial knowledge and are more likely to be male. Evidence
regarding their behavioural biases shows that they are less vulnerable to the
disposition effect. These findings imply that agents with more information
constraints are less capable of making trading decisions by themselves; consequently,
they listen to others and make more mistakes. Interestingly, people in managerial
positions tend to trust grapevine news, a preference for which is actually negatively
correlated with investment performance, although not significantly. A possible
explanation is that managers in China are overconfident about their access to genuine
insider information, the use of which does not usually incur any penalties in China.

The results of the second study clearly indicate that particular individual
heterogeneities predict investment outcomes. The latest literature also finds that a
number of specific heterogeneities account for investor behaviour or performance,
such as genetic makeup, IQ, cognitive ability, sociability and trust. A common
feature of these factors is that they are either determinant of personality, a component
of personality, or are predetermined by personality. This motivated me to test other
intrinsic personalities as determinants for stock market performance. Specifically,
there are a wealth of measures relating to personalities that have been investigated by
psychologists and some of them, for example neuroticism, have been found to affect
the job performance of individuals, and hence are more likely to also affect
individual stock market performance. Therefore, using some unique information
available in the dataset, in the third study I derive a proxy measure for trait anxiety,
one facet of neuroticism. Empirical evidence shows that this proxy measure of trait
anxiety, which captures an agent’s proneness to nervousness, is indeed negatively
associated with stock market performance. These results are robust among the
various alternative proxies and samples. Robustness checks also confirm that such an
association is not due to endogeneity or reverse causality.

4

Section 3. Main contributions
This thesis makes several important contributions. First, it represents the first
comprehensive study on Chinese households using a unique nationally representative
dataset. The main advantage of this dataset is that it not only contains data that are
commonly available from a typical household survey, but also has rich information
related to a household’s preferences towards and participation in financial markets.
This unique feature of the dataset allows for the systematic examination of Chinese
households’ stock investment from a variety of different perspectives, some of which
have and others of which have not been examined in the previous literature.
Admittedly, despite the fact that this dataset is perhaps the best available for
household finance study in China, it does have a number of limitations when
compared with, for instance, the Swedish data studied by Campbell and his
associates (Campbell, 2006; Calvet, Campbell, & Sodini, 2009a; Calvet, Campbell,
& Sodini, 2009b; Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, & Tufano, 2011). Unlike the latter
dataset, the dataset I use is not panel data, nor does it contain stock investment
information based on tax or actual trading records.

Second, I borrow from existing psychological studies of personality and identify an
important personality trait – trait anxiety (TA) – that is closely related to individual
stock market performance. This finding has many important implications. For
household and behavioural finance research, TA serves as a new candidate for
contributing to ability, which is a common latent variable in many economic models.
The effects of TA also shed light on the characteristics of would-be irrational
investors and even noise makers in the stock market, who are very difficult to
identify in advance. Furthermore, policy makers pursuing social fairness goals
should take the effects of TA on investment outcomes into consideration. Household
welfare requires policies that cater for vulnerable groups. Accordingly, anxious
investors and their financial consultants deserve to know the innate limitations
associated with TA. Along with this finding, I also develop a methodology to
measure well-defined psychological traits using large survey data. This opens the
way for household/behavioural finance to make greater use of psychological theories
to study individual investment performance in the future.
5

Thirdly, although the two essays on stockownership and return performance mainly
follow existing literature, I also consider some new factors that have not been
covered previously. For example, I find job satisfaction can be used as a good proxy
for background risk to explain stock market participation.

This thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the literature review. In
Chapter 3, I describe the dataset. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I outline the three studies on
stock market participation, stock investment performance and the effects of trait
anxiety on individual stock investment, respectively. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
The first time when ‘Household Finance’ has been presented and advocated as a
sub-field was by Professor John Campbell in his presidential address to the 2006
American Finance Association annual meeting. After that, household finance has
attracted growing attention and achieved more and more importance in the finance
literature. The current study covers mainly two topics in this field: household stock
market participation and individual stock investment performance. For the rest of this
chapter, I firstly survey literature on stock market participation, which is abundant. I
then summarize main research findings on individual stock investment performance.
They fall broadly in the categories of so-called ‘investor mistakes’ and ‘individual
heterogeneity’.
Section 1. Household Stock Market Participation Determinants
There are extensive researches on the topic of stock market participation. In
Campbell (2006), he summarized the main explanations on what interacts with
individual stock market participation: wealth, income, education, and some basic
demographics, such as age, gender and marital statustabl. More recent studies have
incorporated other determinants, such as trust and culture (Guiso, Sapienza, &
Zingales, 2008), the influence of neighbors and peers (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2004;
Brown, Ivković, Smith, & Weisbenner, 2008), limited numeracy, intelligenc
equotient (IQ), and cognitive ability (Christelis, Jappelli, & Padula, 2010; Grinblatt,
Keloharju, & Linnainmaa, 2011; Grinblatt, Keloharju, & Linnainmaa, 2012) and lack
of asset awareness (Guiso & Jappelli, 2005). In this section, I summarize main
findings by priori literature on determinants of stockownership by classifying them
into five categories: Financial characteristics, Demographic characteristics,
Knowledge and ability, innate preference and External environment. In Appendix 5, I
list the main papers under each category.
I. Demographic characteristics
Gender
Gender differences are usually linked to risk aversion. Evidence shows that women
are less willing to take risks than men. Consequently, many papers have documented
7

that men are more likely to invest in stocks (Haliassos & Bertaut, 1995; Jianakoplos
& Bernasek, 1998; Sundén & Surette, 1998; Barber & Odean, 2001).

Marital status
Many empirical studies incorporate marital status as control variable. The reason
why it matters is usually linked to risk preference or risk sharing. For instance,
according to Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Sundén and Surette (1998), and
Barber and Odean (2001), the differences on willingness to take risk between
genders grow larger in single households because marriage helps risk sharing.
II. Financial characteristics
Wealth
Wealth is the most well-established determinant of stock market participation. Every
research in this field finds the participation rate strongly increase with wealth.
Majority of prior literature has focused on transaction and information costs in
explaining how wealth affects stockownership (Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio,
2003). Fixed costs are usually defined as time and money spent in order to invest in
stocks, and they are found to affect individual’s stock market participation decision
(Bertaut & Starr, 2002; Guiso, Haliassos, & Jappelli, 2003). Since the wealthy can
obtain ‘scale economies’ on their investment with respect to fixed cost, fix cost is
less likely to be a barrier of entry for the wealthier household (Guiso, Haliassos, &
Jappelli, 2003). However, the theory of transaction and information costs cannot
explain the significant variation in stock market participation even amongst the
wealthy households (Mankiw & Zeldes, 1991; Heaton & Lucas, 2000).

Background Risk
Many observable factors contribute to background risk borne by investors, for
instance, health status, entrepreneurship and job. Bad health conditions can increase
expected variance on medical expenditure and labor income. In this context, one can
categorize health status as a determinant of background risk level. Using
self-perceived health status data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the
U.S, Rosen and Wu (2004) find that households in poor health are less likely to hold
financial assets compared to healthy households.
8

III. Knowledge and ability
Education
Education is found to have a strong positive effect on households’ stockownership
(Haliassos & Bertaut, 1995). Cole and Shastry (2009) report a remarkable 7% to 8%
increase in the probability of financial market participation with only one additional
year of schooling. The channels for education to affect stock market participation are
multiple. Firstly, according to Campbell (2006), education reduces the costs of stock
market participation defined in broad terms, as it is easier for educated investors to
understand the risk-reward trade-off of markets and to actually execute trades.
Secondly, education increases financial literacy and cognitive skills, or by affecting
social networks, job opportunities and believes and attitudes (Cole & Shastry, 2009).

Financial literacy
Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) find that those with low literacy are much less
likely to invest in stocks. The authors devised two special modules for the DNB (De
Nederlandsche Bank) Household Survey (DHS), which is a panel data set covering a
representative sample of the Dutch population and providing information on savings
and portfolio choice. Their econometric analysis result on the data shows that lack of
understanding of economics and finance is a significant deterrent to stock ownership,
after cognitive abilities being controlled.

Awareness
Using data on the 1995 and 1998 waves of the Italian Survey of Household Income
and Wealth, Guiso and Jappelli (2005) find ‘Lack of financial awareness has
important implications for understanding the stockholding puzzle and for estimating
stock market participation costs’.

Cognitive abilities
Cognitive abilities have been one of the main focuses in recent research on stock
market participation due to its crucial role in constituting information cost of
individual’s to participate in stock market.

Several recent papers provide strong evidence. Using the US Longitudinal Survey of
9

Youth, Cole and Shastry (2009) report that cognitive ability plays a major role in the
overall decision to participate in the financial markets. Similar conclusion was drawn
by Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2010), using the math, verbal and recall tests of
Survey on Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).

If note that cognitive ability is correlated with IQ and determined by a large extent by
gene, the evidences are more abundant. An impressive finding is by Grinblatt,
Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2011) that individuals with high IQ scores measured in
early twenties are more likely to invest stock in the later life, having all relevant
demographic and occupational variables being controlled. This effect remains
significant even amongst the most affluent 10% of their sample. By decompose the
cross sectional variation in investor behavior, Barnea, Cronqvist, and Siegel (2010)
find that genetic factor explains about one third of the variance in stock market
participation and asset allocation in a study of twins. Their interpretation of this
genetic component of stock market participation is that there are innate differences in
factors affecting effective stock market participation costs, and they attribute the
genetic component of asset allocation to genetic variation in risk preferences.

As a financial decision, stock market participation involves a specific human capital
investment in terms of effort and time from the investors to first familiarize
themselves with the concepts involved in investing and later on to follow the market
development to make justifiable financial decisions. Therefore, cognitive abilities
can significantly affect stockownership by affect fixed participation cost.

On the other hand, cognitive abilities also affect individual decision making through
changes in time and risk. Using US Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Benjamin, Brown
and Shapiro (2006) find that more cognitively able individuals are more risk neutral
over small stakes and more patient over short time horizons. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
Sunde, Schupp and Wagner (2011) study a random sample of 1,000 German adults
and report that lower cognitive abilities are associated with greater risk aversion and
impatience even controlling for education, income and credit constraints.
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IV. Innate preference
Risk aversion
It has been widely documented in prior literature that risk aversion reduces the
probability of stock market participation. The first influential study that demonstrates
extremely high risk aversion as an explanation for non-participation in stock market
may be by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Later on, a body of literature attributes low
risk tolerance to low stock market participation rate in reality. For example, Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991) quantify the level of risk aversion based on historical risk
premiums. Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003) concludes that non-stockholding
households are more risk averse than their stockholding counterparts.

Trust
The role of trust in stock market participation attracts much attention recently. This is
mainly aroused by two papers of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) and
Georgarakos and Pasini (2011). Using the World Values Survey, Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2008) find that trusting individuals are significantly more likely to be
stockowners, with the effect of trust remains equally strong for wealthier households.
Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) come to similar conclusions in their study of trust,
sociability and stock market participation. In addition, their evidence shows that the
effect of regional changes in trust is strongest in the countries where the prevailing
level of trust is low.

Personal values
Kaustia and Torstila (2011) for the first time link personal values with investment
decisions. The authors postulate that a portion of the public can shy away from the
stock market due to their personal values when they apply value-expressive
considerations in their stock market participation decision. Evidence from unique
data sets in Finland is consistent with their idea that personal values are a factor in
important investment decisions: there exists a strong positive correlation between
political orientation and investing in stock, with a moderate left voter being 17-20%
less likely to own stocks than a moderate right voter.

Sociability
11

Sociability and social interaction have been one of the main focuses in recent
behavioral finance research. Because of the high correlation between these two
issues, I introduce them together in the next subsection.
V. External environment
Social interaction
Growing evidence shows that social interaction influences stockownership decision.
In 2004, Hong, Kubik and Stein find that households interacting with their neighbors
or attending church are more likely to participate in the stock market than non-social
households. Brown, Ivković, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008) establish a causal
relation between individual and community stock market participation. The authors
find that a 10% increase in community stock ownership increases the probability of
individual stock market participation by 4% on average. And individuals’ stock
market entry decisions are shown to be affected by the stock investment performance
of their local peers in the previous month, according to Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012).

There are several different mechanisms through which social interaction can
stimulate stock market participation. According to Hong, Kubik, amd Stein (2004),
social interaction lowers the fixed psychological costs of stock market participation
because information can be exchanged by means of word-of-mouth communication
or observational learning (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Ellison &
Fudenberg, 1993; Ellison & Fudenberg, 1995). Alternatively, Guiso and Jappelli
(2005) interpret Social interaction and social learning function as an additional
channel for financial awareness if information distribution otherwise is scarce.

Culture
For long time, culture was found to have impact on stockholding. An intra-country
analysis of Finnish stockholders shows that households are apt to the influence of
distance, language and culture (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001a). And Stulz and
Williamson (2003) find that cultural aspects explain cross-country variation in
individual stockholder rights even controlling for the legal origin of a country. More
recently, the integration of cultural aspect and financial questions has led to studies
on its implications for financial markets. Breuer and Quinten (2009) even propose to
12

separate ‘cultural finance’ to its own autonomous discipline.

Section 2. Determinants of Investment Performance: Behavioral Bias and
Individual Heterogeneity
Why do individual stock investment performances vary? If the markets are always
efficient in the sense that they always correctly pricing assets, then the optimal
strategy should be passive strategy, where everybody end up with identical market
return. However in reality, due to market inefficiency as well as individual-specific
liquidity and information constraints, investors choose heterogeneous strategies
which lead to variations in outcomes. The interesting question is what individual
investor characteristics can lead to differences in investment strategies that in term
affect investment outcomes across periods and markets. The literature directly
linking investor heterogeneities with their stock investment performance are rare. I
divide them into two types: (1) papers investigating investor behavior bias which is
detrimental to investment performance; (2) papers investigating human’s intrinsic
heterogeneities’ effect on investor behavior which eventually determines investment
performance. I will respectively introduce them one by one.

Investor mistake or investor behavioral bias refers to investor behavior that is deviate
from theory predicted rational and leading to detrimental consequence. Campbell
(2006) labeled under-diversification, risky share inertia, and the tendency to sell
winning stocks and hold losing stocks (the disposition effect) as investor mistakes.
They carried out a series of work to investigate the determinants of these mistakes
and their consequences in terms of investment return. Campbell (2006) argues that a
minority of households makes significant investment mistakes, according to evidence
on participation and diversification. He further finds that the minority is poorer and
less well educated than the majority of more successful investors. Calvet, Campbell
and Sodini (2007) investigate the efficiency of household investment decisions in a
dataset containing the disaggregated wealth and income of the entire population of
Sweden. Their analysis focuses on two main sources of inefficiency in the financial
portfolio: under-diversification of risky assets (‘down’) and nonparticipation in risky
asset markets (‘out’). They find that a few households are very poorly diversified.
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They document that the welfare cost of nonparticipation is smaller by almost one half
when they take account of the fact that nonparticipants would be unlikely to invest
efficiently if they participated in risky asset markets. Calvet, Campbell and Sodini
(2009b) constructed an index of financial sophistication that explains a set of
investor mistakes: under-diversification, risky share inertia, and disposition effect.
Using comprehensive data on Swedish households, their index of financial
sophistication predicts performance well. This index is strongly positively correlated
with financial wealth and household size, and also positively correlated with
education and proxies for financial experience.

On the other hand, in the recent three years, many papers published in top financial
journals explored the household finance with emphasis on individual heterogeneities,
especially intrinsic heterogeneities, such as genetic factor (Barnea, Cronqvist, &
Siegel, 2010), trust, peer effect and sociability (Hong, Kubik, & Stein 2004; Guiso,
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008; Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011; Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2012),
cognitive ability; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp & Wagner, 2011), and
intelligence quality (IQ) (Grinblatt, Keloharju, & Linnainmaa, 2012). These recent
work encourage a direction to reveal intrinsic heterogeneity among investors. For
instance, Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2012) analyse whether IQ influences
trading behavior, performance, and transaction costs. They find that high-IQ
investors exhibit superior market timing, stock-picking skill, trade execution, and are
less subject to the disposition effect, more aggressive about tax-loss trading, more
able to control a variety of factors. As a result, High-IQ investors achieve much
higher stock investment return rates. Take gambling performance as another example.
In the paper ‘Who gambles in the stock market?’, Kumar (2009) finds that
socioeconomic factors that induce greater expenditure in lotteries are also related
with greater investment in lottery-type stocks. His evidence shows that investor with
gambling preference are more likely to underperform because they fancy lottery-type
stocks which underperform. And these investors who excessively overweight
lottery-type stocks are more likely to have low-income.
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Chapter 3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Section 1. Data source
The dataset for this study combines two surveys: a random subsample of the 2009
China Urban Household Survey (CUHS) and a trailer survey applied on this
subsample, the China Household Finance Service Demand Survey (CFS). As
aforementioned, the CUHS, which has been carried out annually by the State Bureau
of Statistics since the beginning of 1980s, is the best available nationally
representative survey of urban households in China. The questions in the CUHS
cover a wide range of individual-level detailed information including household
members’ demographic characteristics, employment information, income and
expenditure, and household-level information including household size, composition
and living conditions. The CUHS is based on a probabilistic sample and stratified
design. The sample is designed to be representative of the populations in over 220
cities and towns of various sizes and in various regions in China. The cities, towns
and households are selected based on the principle of random and representative
sampling. The data are collected over the course of a year. The participating
households are asked to keep a record of their income and expenditure, which is
collected every month by a surveyor. The rich data used in this thesis come from the
2009 survey. So far, CUHS is the best available household survey in China and has
been studied by numerous scholars, including Heckman and Li (2004), Chamon, Liu,
and Prasad (2010).

The CFS was designed by members of the Department of Economics at Lingnan
University, Hong Kong. The questions in the CFS cover an exhaustive breakdown of
householders’ assets, stock holdings, and investment preferences, attitudes,
behaviour and performance, together with a series of questions on how the global
financial crisis affected their personal and economic wellbeing. The CFS was
collected exclusively for Lingnan University by the Department of Urban Surveys of
the State Bureau of Statistics of China as a trailer survey of a random sub-sample of
the 2009 CUHS. The CFS randomly selected 10,043 households out of the total
65,000 households covered by the 2009 CUHS. After data cleaning, 10,030
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observations were included in the sample.
Section 2. Main advantage and disadvantage of the dataset
One of the main advantages of the dataset is its good combination of information on
abundant demographic and financial characteristics. It also contains a host of
subjective and objective investment-related variables. In addition to demographic,
job and financial characteristics that are common in household surveys, the questions
in our surveys cover a wide range of information regarding exhaustive breakdowns
of asset allocation, income and consumption patterns and various factors relating to
the stock market investment attitude, behaviour and performance of heads of
households. For example, it contains variables reflecting risk aversion, gambling
preference, marginal consumption tendency, optimism in expectation on economy
and social development, job and life satisfaction, information screening preference
for stock trading, etc. The information that is typically not available in many other
datasets has proven to be an important factor affecting individual investment. Thus,
this rich dataset provides a unique opportunity to investigate households’ investment
decisions from various new angles. Moreover, the most distinguishing feature of the
dataset lies in the type of experimental questions it contains on global financial crisis;
this enables me to derive proxies for personality trait anxiety.

Admittedly, the dataset also suffers from some limitations. For instance, unlike the
Swedish data used by Campbell (2006), Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009a),
Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009b), and Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, and Tufano
(2011), information on investment return is self-reported by interviewees rather than
from trading records. Such measures may be more prone to individual misreport and
measurement errors. Therefore, to reduce the influence of these potential
measurement errors, I first carry out a sensitivity test of the results on stock
investment return using an alternative measure: a dummy variable indicating whether
an individual has suffered recent losses in the stock market. This measure, although
less informative, should prove more reliable. Second, the dataset is merely cross
sectional rather than panel, which prevents me from examining the long-term effects
of many factors and makes it difficult to control for missing information. Third, the
quality of Chinese data is often criticised. However, most of the controversies
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regarding the accuracy of the data collected by the Chinese government relate to the
macro data. The CFS is a micro dataset collected from many individual households,
rather than constituting macro data reported by local governments. Furthermore, the
questions in the trailer survey were all designed and commissioned by the research
team of Lingnan University, and carried out by the DUS (Department of Urban
Surveys) of the State Bureau of Statistics, which has little incentive to manipulate the
data.
Section 3. Summary on variables
To summarise the main characteristics of the data, I report descriptive statistics of
basic demographic characteristics, financial characteristics and other key variables in
the regressions, respectively in Tables 1, 2 and 3.

All respondents in the sample are household heads. As shown in Table 1-1, the mean
age of interviewees is about 49 with a standard deviation of 11.97 years; 11.52% of
respondents are below 35 years old; 27.14% are from 35 to 44; 43.44% are from 45
to 59, and the remaining 17.90% are 60 and above. Out of 10,030 effective
observations in the sample, nearly 34% of households are headed by females. Among
these 3,405 women, 2,827 are married and the remaining 578 are single, divorced or
widowed. Therefore, roughly 30% of married couples select the female as the
household head. This is not surprising as the household head is defined as the family
member who is in charge of major decisions for the family, and is usually also the
main breadwinner. With respect to nationality, the minority counts for 3.18% of the
sample and the rest are of Han nationality. The size of households in the sample
ranges from 1 to 8 people, with an average of 2.9. Such a low figure is a direct result
of China’s one child policy. Table 1-2 reports the composition of households with
respect to their self-reported preferences and attitudes such as risk tolerance. Half of
the household heads in the sample claim that they prefer moderate exposure to
financial risk for corresponding risk premium. However, 42% of them are not willing
to take any risk at all. Only 8% of households choose the ‘high risk with high return’
pair.

Table 2, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for households’ financial condition
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variables. They are the first four moments and three important percentiles of family
asset, income, expenditure and relevant ratios. All variables are left skewed and
leptokurtic, with means much bigger than medians. Abnormal observations deviated
far from the means. Considering bank savings as an example, the households on the
25th percentile have only 10,000 RMB Yuan while those on the 95th percentile have
20 times that amount. Although the mean value of bank savings is about 89,000
RMB Yuan, the median is only 30,000. From Table 2, Panel A, we can see that
residential housing is the most significant asset for the majority of households while
stock is the main form of financial asset held by Chinese households. The bond
holding is negligible. Less than 5% of households own real estate as an investment.
Table 2, Panel B gives further breakdowns of some financial characteristics, together
with the stock ownership ratio conditional on them. 12.68% of the households in the
sample have income less than half of the median. Only 6.49% of these people own
stocks. 14.57% of households in the sample do not have bank savings, but 14.58% of
these own stocks. About 85.3% of households own real property, and 5,646 people
have no mortgage, which accounts for 66% of home owners.

Table 3 has three Panels, in which I summarise the descriptive statistics of the key
variables in my regressions. The variables are listed in sequence according to their
appearance in regressions. For example, in Panel A, those variables measuring
wealth and income, education and information attainment appear in all three essays;
variables measuring job satisfaction are key for both the first and the second essay,
which are respectively elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5. It is worth noting that for
many variables, the mean and median diverge considerably. The most noticeable
difference is witnessed in Panel B on AR 1 , which is seriously skewed. Similar to
AR 2 , the median of AR 1 is also negative, -5.9%, but the mean is positive, about 2.8%.
More detailed information can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, which show the
distributions of the return rates.

18

Chapter 4. In or Out: Stock Market Participation
Section 1 Introduction
The discrepancy between real-life stock investment behaviour and theoretically ideal
behaviour is central to the study of household finance, according to Campbell (2006).
To investigate this key problem, the natural first step is to explore the determinants of
household stock ownership. In other words, when Chinese households are confronted
with stock markets, who participates and who stays out?

This ‘In or Out’ question has been widely investigated over the past five years, and is
well-known for the ‘stock market nonparticipation puzzle’. As Bonaparte and
Fabozzi (2011) observe: ‘Only 19% of U.S. households hold stocks directly
according to data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). This low rate
of participation is puzzling to economists because the historical average annual
return of the U.S. stock market has been approximately 700 basis points higher than
the return on U.S. Treasury bills’. Addressing this puzzle has at least three important
implications. First, stock market participation allows the equity premium to play an
important role in household welfare accumulation and hence affects living standards,
which are the ultimate concern of economic development. Due to the equity premium,
investment in stock will, theoretically, make a substantial difference to household
wealth accumulation over the long term. Second, there is some evidence to suggest
that different outcomes of wealth accumulation can further increase income
inequality with increasing severity. Third, the welfare benefits of financial markets
rely to a large extent on how efficiently households exploit the markets, and market
efficiency also depends on the behaviour of households as market participants. In
fact, the above-stated puzzle has long been known to economists and Mehra and
Prescott (1985) coined it the ‘equity premium puzzle’ 1. In short, the issues of
household welfare, income inequality and market efficiency are all tightly linked to
research on positive finance that aims to identify the determinants of households
stock market participation.

1

For more reference, see Cochrane (2001). For the link between stock market participation and the equity
premium puzzle, see Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).
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Despite the many efforts that economists have made over the past two decades to
explain this puzzle, household stock market participation largely remains the ‘black
box’ of household finance decision making. The study reported in this chapter
contributes to the body of literature on the ‘stock market nonparticipation puzzle’ in
the following three respects. First, it examines whether the stock participation
behaviour of Chinese households is consistent with such behaviour in other
developed countries. Second, it aims to show whether the decision to invest in stock
resembles the decision to take a second job by exploring how job satisfaction affects
household stock-ownership decisions. I investigate respondents’ self-reported
satisfaction with several aspects of their jobs and find that dissatisfaction with the job
overall, and with pay and fringe benefit specifically, lead to stock investment
behaviour, whereas satisfaction with hours of work, job stability and security boost
the likelihood of employees becoming stock owners. The evidence implies that the
stock market participation decision is subject to the same underlying incentives as
the second job participation decision.

The findings from the study have the following implications. First, the study applies
a standard empirical approach to a unique Chinese household survey dataset. In so
doing, it enriches the literature by providing new evidence from a large, developing
and transitional economy. My findings indicate that the majority of the phenomena
and rules in China are consistent with those found in, for example, the US and
Europe. As numerous pioneers in this domain report in relation to developed
countries, the stock market participation rate in China is low (about 20% according
to the data). It is also exhibits heterogeneities with respect to wealth and information
cost that account for the stock investments of Chinese households. As mention by
Campbell (2006), studying positive household finance has always been difficult due
to the scarcity of data. High quality data from developing countries are even harder
to come by. Moreover, studies conducted in China have special implications for this
domain because China is a huge developing country, its stock market only re-opened
two decades ago and it is still under strict control by the government. China is also
unique due to its fast economic growth rate during the past three decades and its
extremely high household saving rate. In this context, the current study fills an
important gap in the literature on positive household finance in China.
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This study also introduces a new perspective by linking job satisfaction with stock
market participation. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to find
evidence that dissatisfaction with one’s job in general, and pay in particular,
satisfaction with hours of work and job stability all influence stock market
participation. Intuitively, investing in stock resembles taking a second job in two
respects: first, they both cost time, i.e. labour input; second, they are both intended to
boost income. In this context, dissatisfaction with one’s job should be a motivation to
take a second job, including the ‘quasi job’ of stock investment involvement. This
conjecture is also consistent with the predictions from the prospect theory, in which
dissatisfaction with one’s job and job income makes an individual more willing to
entertain other risky opportunities. In contrast, satisfaction with one’s job security
can be viewed as reflecting a lower level of background risk. The empirical results
show that the evidence from China supports these theoretical predictions well. The
findings here contribute to the literature on both labour economics and finance.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, I study the
determinants of stock market participation using a traditional approach. In Section 3,
I explore stock-ownership decisions specifically from the perspective of job
satisfaction. In Section 4, I investigate whether public sector employees differ with
respect to their stock market participation behaviour. Section 5 concludes.
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Section 2 Determinants of Stock Market Participation in China
I. Empirical Framework
The standard Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) and other
textbook models fail to explain the lower than expected stock market participation
rates. This is often referred to as the stock market participation puzzle, which has
been linked to the equity premium puzzle. Mehra and Prescott (1985) proposed that
the latter could be improved by incorporating additional frictional factors, such as
transaction, information and entry costs. Since then, the equity premium puzzle and
stock market participation puzzle have become entangled in a sub-strand of the
literature. There has been some interest in examining how the stock market
participation puzzle relates to the equity premium puzzle. Consequently, numerous
studies have sought to identify the important determinants of stock market
participation that ease the above mentioned market frictions. Bogan (2008)
constructs a calibrated CCAPM model from the standard frictionless CCAPM by
adding constraints such as transaction, information and entry costs, which satisfies
the necessary frictional conditions suggested by Mehra and Prescott (1985). In the
calibrated CCAPM (Bogan, 2008), agents maximise the expected value of
discounted utility. The utility function is additively separable, and future utility is
discounted at a rate of 𝛿𝛿. Each agent can borrow or invest in two assets, risk free

asset with a riskless rate of return and stock with a stochastic return. As shown in the

following, the optimisation specification is the same as that of a standard frictionless
CCAPM, but the constraints are different. Here the additional factor, i.e. the
cost/opportunity cost of the time spent in obtaining investment information or
transaction costs, is modelled and represented by the lump sum expense of
purchasing investment information.
𝑇𝑇

max 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 𝛿𝛿 𝑡𝑡 𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡

𝑡𝑡=0

s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡

𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1 =𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 (1 + 𝑟𝑟) + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡

Where meaning of symbols are as following:
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 : real consumption in time t
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𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 : total wealth at time t

𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 : exogenous real labor income in t
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 : total real saving in t

𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 : a cost of individual stock market participation, referring to cost ( including

opportunity cost) of the time spent in obtaining investment information or
transaction costs
1 + 𝑟𝑟: the gross riskless return

𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 : the amount saved in the risky asset in time t.

z: is the excess return on stocks over the riskless rate

It is worth noting that when the initial cost of acquiring the information necessary for
market participation, or the recurring expense of maintaining a portfolio and
investing in new opportunities, is high enough,

an individual will persistently shun

away from the market as result. Thus, if the cost of participating 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 is perceived to

be sufficiently high to remove the expected utility gain, the household will not invest
any stock.

The allocation of disposable income to capital assets in Bogan’s calibrated CCAPM
model is based on a household utility optimisation equation. Because theory expects
individuals to maximise their utility function, economists are able to model the
optimal allocation levels from an indirect utility derived from the CCAPM.
Following Bogan’s approach 2 for defining the dependent variable, between the
assumed linear indirect utility function of stockholders 𝑈𝑈 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠 +𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , and that of

non-stockholders, 𝑈𝑈 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 +𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , where 𝑋𝑋 i are the observable characteristics of

household i and e i is the error term. Because the indirect function is unobservable, we

must turn to the participation decision of household i, D i to participate or abstain. If
𝐷𝐷 𝑖𝑖 = 1 when 𝑈𝑈 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 > 𝑈𝑈 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , it implies that a household participates in the stock market

because its indirect utility is greater when holding than when not holding stocks.
Following the same reasoning, 𝐷𝐷 𝑖𝑖 = 0 when 𝑈𝑈 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 < 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 because a household will
abstain from the stock market when its utility is not maximised when holding stocks.
These outputs, 𝐷𝐷 𝑖𝑖 = 1 and 𝐷𝐷 𝑖𝑖 = 0, are the two outcomes of the binary dependent
2

The Bogan’s approach is consistent with Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).
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variable, Stock-owner Dummy, P(D i = 1) = P(U nsi < U si ).
Moving towards the right side of the equation, the focus turns to the household
characteristics that affect the probability that a household owns stock at time 0. I
classify the potential determinants of stock market participation into two categories:
(1) general household characteristics contributing to constraints and (2) behavioural
heterogeneity. The variables in the first category reflect the components in Bogan’s
calibrated CCAPM. I further divide them into three groups, reflecting the wealth
effect, information cost and demographic characteristics, which are usually used as
control variables in the literature. They are correspondingly named as WEALTH,
INFORMATION and X in the following model specifications, where X denotes the
control variables.

Similar to an approach taken in Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), my empirical model
specification is as following:

Model (I):
𝐿𝐿

𝑃𝑃

𝑙𝑙=𝐾𝐾+1

𝑝𝑝=𝐿𝐿+1

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁

𝐾𝐾

+ � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛=𝑀𝑀+1

𝑘𝑘=1

For robust check, I have another three models with specification as the followings:

Model (II):
𝐾𝐾

𝐿𝐿

𝑘𝑘=1

𝑙𝑙=𝐾𝐾+1

𝐾𝐾

𝑃𝑃

𝑘𝑘=1

𝑝𝑝=𝐾𝐾+1

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

Model (III):
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

Model (IV):
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𝐾𝐾

𝑁𝑁

𝑘𝑘=1

𝑛𝑛=𝐾𝐾+1

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

By including fewer independent variables, the robustness check regressions are less
likely to suffer multicollinearity problems. Comparison between the model results
will provide a better understanding of each determinant’s effect.
II. Regression Results and Robust Check
The main results are reported in Table 4-1, Panel A column (I). The dependent
variable in the regression is a binary variable, i.e. Stock-owner Dummy, which takes
the value of one if a respondent had previously participated or was currently
participating in the stock market at the time s/he took the survey, and zero otherwise.
The independent variables comprise two groups of variables, one reflecting
constraints and the other reflecting behavioural heterogeneities, controlled by a
variety of demographic characteristics, working industry, occupation and position.
The partial effects measured by the means of the independent variables are reported
in column (I); the coefficients, z values and p values are reported in columns (II), (III)
and (IV) respectively, while column (V) reports the means of the independent
variables. The regression is run with a sample of 9,027 observations. The predicted
participation rate is 16.75% at the mean of each independent variable. The observed
rate is 22.76%. The estimated pseudo R square of the model is about 21%, which is
rather high for a cross-sectional regression study. Many variables are significantly
correlated with stock market participation, consistent with theoretical predictions or
previous findings. Most of their coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The
results of the analyses are presented in detail in the following sections.

The results of the robustness check regressions are reported in Table 4-1, Panel B
columns (II) and (III), while in column (I) same regression to that in Panel A is listed
for comparison. Specification (II) only includes the group of independent variables
reflecting constraints, which are mainly concerned with wealth and information cost,
whereas specification (III) only includes the group of independent variables
reflecting behavioural facts.
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Wealth
I exploit two wealth measures: total household assets, and a group of dummy
variables. Unsurprisingly, Total Asset stands out as the most influential determinant
of stock ownership. In the mean position, every 10,000 RMB increase in Total Asset
leads to an increase of 11.5% in the probability of a household investing its equity.
The survey also included the question 3 ‘How do investment results affect your daily
life? (1) a lot, (2) a little, (3) no effect’. I define a group of dummy variables, High
Vulnerability to Wealth Risk Dummy, indicating respondents who chose ‘(1) a lot’,
and a No High Vulnerability to Wealth Risk Dummy indicating respondents who
chose ‘(3) no effect’, while respondents who chose (2) are used as the reference
group. As shown in Panel A of Table 4-1, individuals who indicated that investment
outcomes had ‘a lot’ of effect on their lives were 7.9% less likely to hold equity than
the reference group. In contrast, those who indicated ‘no effect’ had a 5.1% higher
probability of investing than the reference group.

The robustness check in model (II) produces the similar result as that in model (I).
There is considerable variation in both the magnitudes and confidence levels,
implying that Total Wealth is strongly correlated with other explanatory variables.

Information Constraints
The cost of stock market participation may be the entry cost or the information cost.
The entry cost serves as a threshold for a household’s wealth: it only matters for
households that are extremely poor. Conceivably, the information cost plays a
broader role in households’ in-or-out decisions. As the ability and accessibility to
information are attributed to the individual-specific information cost, I exploit the
variables that reflect them.

First, education level and labour income are traditional proxies for ability. Compared
with those with a below high school level of education, those with higher education
levels have a greater propensity to participate in the stock market. High school or
technical school diploma holders are 4.6% more likely to participate in the stock
market. A college education increases this difference in participation to 5.9%.
3

See Appendix 2 Q7.
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Unsurprisingly, personal labour income is positively correlated with the probability
of stock market participation.

Three variables more directly reflect information cost. Those who have some
knowledge of financial matters are 6.9% more likely to invest equity than those who
have no idea about whether the global financial crisis ever occurred. Dwelling in a
financial centre metropolis and having Internet access at home also increase the
probability of participation by roughly the same amount.

The robustness check reported in Column (II) of Panel B supports all of the above
findings. The material difference in the magnitudes of the coefficients and the
confidence levels for educational attainment and labour income suggest that these
variables interact with other independent variables.

Behavioural Heterogeneity
Many findings from the group of variables reflecting individual heterogeneities in
terms of risk preferences, gambling preferences, propensity to consume and beliefs
about the future economy are consistent with the literature. The risk aversion effect
stands out as the most influential determinant. The survey asked respondents to
choose an asset from three options: (1) high risk and high expected return; (2)
medium risk and medium expected return; and (3) no risk at all. Consequently, I
include a dummy variable, High Risk Tolerance Dummy, to indicate a choice of (1);
a Low Risk Tolerance Dummy to indicate a choice of (3); and a Medium Risk
Tolerance Dummy to indicate the choice of (2), which is omitted from the regression
as the reference. The regression results show that choosing the high-risk-high-return
asset increases the probability of stock ownership by 10.4%, while this probability
drops by 22.5% for those who report zero tolerance on financial risk. Lottery ticket
buyers are also more likely to buy stock, other things being equal. Unsurprisingly,
personal optimism about the future economy is positively associated with stock
market participation. Such a finding is intuitive if we believe that optimism about the
future economy leads to the expectation of higher stock market returns. Finally,
individuals who are less inclined toward frugality are more likely to invest in stocks.

27

Panel B model (III) presents the results of the robustness check on the effects of
behavioural heterogeneities. The results are almost identical to those in Panel B
model (I), implying that these effects are independent from the other group of
explanatory variables.

Demographic characteristics
The probability of stock market participation appears to increase with age, but at a
decreasing rate. Such a result seems to fit intuition well. When people are young they
have few savings and hence are less likely to be able to invest in stocks. Once people
are approaching or are past retirement age, their savings again decline and, as they
have to live on past savings, their investments tend to be more conservative.

According to the partial effect reported by the probit model, females in China have
about a 4.5% higher probability of participating than males. This finding is consistent
with the descriptive statistics in Table 1, which show that the conditional
participation rate is 21.53% for females and 17.70% for males. Although this result
may seem puzzling, it is consistent with some previous studies. A possible
explanation is that females may face lower opportunity costs than males.

Again, marriage is found to have a positive influence on stock ownership. The partial
effect reported by the probit model suggests that married couples have a 6% higher
probability of participating than others. This is also consistent with the conditional
participation rate shown in Table 1, which are 20.82% for married heads of
households and 12.37% for others.

Finally, those from ethnic minorities are significantly less likely to buy stocks than
the Han majority, with the difference in the estimated probability as high as 7%.
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Section 3. Job Satisfaction and Stock Market Participation
A household’s portfolio is comprised not only by financial assets but also human
capital. Human capital resembles bonds in two respects: human capital generates
labour income just as bonds yield coupon; and labour income is subject to risk just as
a bond’s coupon is. Conversely, to invest in the stock market is similar to taking on a
second job in two respects: both are intended to boost income, and both cost time and
energy. The construction of a financial portfolio is a task that should not be isolated
from overall household portfolio construction problems, i.e. a household’s decisions
with respect to financial markets and its decisions in relation to labour market
interact. In reality, the majority of households have labour income. Meanwhile
investing in stock is an available option for boosting income, and is similar to taking
a second job. It is well known that the motivation for taking a second job is often
related to the status of the primary job. The question is how job related factors
influence a household’s motivation to invest in equity. In this section, I investigate
household stock market participation decision from a new perspective: job
satisfaction; in my study this includes both overall job satisfaction and satisfaction
with three specific aspects, respectively pay, hours of work, and job stability.
I. Theory and hypothesis
As stated above, when one considers that participating in the stock market is similar
to taking a second job, it is then natural to link job satisfaction with an individual’s
decision to invest in the stock market. There are several well-known theories in
finance that lead to the same conclusion. I present these theories together with a
corresponding prediction on how job satisfaction affects stock market participation
decision.

Prospect theory
According to the prospect theory 4 put forward by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), an
agent is more likely to be risk averse when he is already gaining or when things are
generally going well for him, and risk seeking when he suffers a loss or when things
are generally not going well. Based on this theory, if an agent holds higher overall
4

The model is illustrated in Figure 1.
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job satisfaction and higher satisfaction with pay (gaining) specifically, he is more
likely to be risk averse and hence less likely to participate in the stock market. Hence,
we have the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: People who hold higher overall job satisfaction and/or satisfaction
with job pay are less likely to participate in the stock market.

Background risk
It is established in the literature (Heaton & Lucas, 2000; Rosen & Wu, 2004) that
background risk exposure effectively decreases investment in stock. Intuitively, job
stability and security should influence a person’s assessment of their own
background risk. Therefore, I hypothesise that satisfaction on job stability and
security are positively correlated with willingness to include risky asset like stock in
one’s portfolio. Hence, we have the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: People who hold higher satisfaction with job stability and job security
are more likely to participate in the stock market.

Participation cost
In general, whether an individual participates in the stock market should be related to
the inherent cost that individual faces by so doing. Because stock market
participation is a time consuming activity, time cost is an important element of
participation cost. Hence, other things being equal, it is reasonable to assume that an
individual with more free time is more likely to participate in the stock market.
Intuitively, someone who reports higher satisfaction with hours of work is more
likely to have more free time. Therefore, we should expect a positive correlation
between satisfaction on hours of work and stock market participation.

Hypothesis 3: People who hold higher satisfaction with hours of work are more
likely to participate in the stock market.
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II. Empirical evidence
The regression model for testing the aforementioned hypotheses takes the following
form:

Model:
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 +𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆_𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝛽𝛽3 𝑆𝑆_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇+𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

where 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 refers to Stock-owner Dummy; and ‘S_’ in name of independent
variables refers to ‘Satisfaction on’ for short.

Hypothesis:
𝛽𝛽1 < 0,

𝛽𝛽2 < 0,

𝛽𝛽3 > 0,

𝛽𝛽4 > 0,

𝛽𝛽5 > 0

The regression results provide strong support for the hypotheses, and the findings are
persistent to the robustness checks. As reported both in Table 4-2, Panel A column (I)
and Panel B column (I), all of the effects have the predicted sign, and are significant
at least at the 5% confidence level. Every one unit decrease in the general satisfaction
with job scores leads to a 3.3% increase in the probability of the agent participating
in the stock market. Specifically, satisfaction with pay and fringe benefit are
negatively associated with stock ownership. Every one unit increase in satisfaction
with pay scores decreases the probability of investing in stock by 1.6%. Moreover, as
predicted, satisfaction with hours of work increases the probability of stock market
participation with a magnitude similar to that of satisfaction with pay. Satisfaction
with job stability stands out as the most influential determinant among all job
satisfaction aspects: one unit increase in satisfaction with job stability scores
increases the probability of investing in stock by 3.4%. Satisfaction with job security
is also positively correlated with stock investment involvement, as predicted. Finally,
satisfaction on relationships with co-workers shows no correlation with stock market
participation.

The results above persist when more control variables are included, as shown in the
results of the robustness check regressions in Table 4-2, Panel B. The magnitudes and
confidence levels of the pay-content effects increase when the absolute level of
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labour income is controlled. This disentangles the effects of objective and subjective
income. Moreover, as predicted, satisfaction with hours of work increases the
probability of stock market participation, and this effect does not disappear even
when controlling for a variety of traditional determinants. It is worth noting that
these effects could be covered by the risk tolerance effect because they are both
positively correlated with risk tolerance, which is not surprising. To sum up, all of
the evidence provides support for the hypotheses.
Section 4. Conclusion
Like in developed countries, many households in China face the decision of whether
to participate in stock markets or stay out of them. According to the CUHS, about 20%
of Chinese households choose to hold some risky financial assets, or public equity, in
their portfolios. The first study in this section adopts a standard approach (Campbell,
2006; Calvet, Campbell, & Sodini, 2006; Calvet, Campbell, & Sodini, 2009a; Calvet,
Campbell, & Sodini, 2009b) and finds that Chinese stock owners can be
characterized by individual- or household-level features that reflect the constraints
and behavioural factors that are suggested by traditional theoretical models with
extension with friction--for instance, demographic characteristics such as age, gender,
marriage and ethnicity; socio-economic characteristics such as wealth, income,
education, industry and city of residence; and behavioural characteristics such as risk
preference, consumption preference, gambling preference, optimism etc. The
findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions and evidence from developed
countries.

I have investigated the stock market participation problem from the novel perspective
of job satisfaction. In general, discontentment with one’s job motivates stock
investment activity. Specifically, dissatisfaction with pay is the most influential
aspect of job satisfaction that induces stock acquisition. Satisfaction with job
stability/security and satisfaction with hours of work boost the probability of
households participating in the stock market. These results support the theoretical
prediction of the prospect theory and the theories regarding background risk and
participation cost.
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However, this study may have several limitations. First, the data are cross-sectional,
and the regressions may suffer from some missing variables. Second, the theoretical
model does not include the non-financial assets allocation problem. In reality,
households’ portfolios include not only financial assets and human capital, but also a
number of other types of assets. Future studies may take these effects into account.
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Chapter 5. Win or Lose: Individual Stock Investment Performance
Section 1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I investigate which Chinese households participate in and
which stay out of the stock market. The next natural question to ask is which of those
participating households are the winners and which are the losers? This study
investigates what investor characteristics affect individuals’ stock investment returns,
with an emphasis on the role of information screening preferences (ISPs).

Some investor characteristics are found to contribute to investors’ stock portfolio
return performance; for instance, wealth, education level, personality and features
that bring information advantages. Some of these characteristics are also at work in
investors’ ISPs and behavioural biases, which affect performance directly. For
example, the propensity to highly value the views of one’s peers or grapevine news is
associated with the under-diversification and disposition effects, both of which take a
toll on investment return performance. Interestingly, when high wealth, high
education, more confidence, rational behaviour and outperformance are aligned,
mangers in China are found to particularly favour grapevine news when making
stock-investment decisions, although the educational level of managers is
significantly higher. This may result from managers’ overconfidence in being able to
access insider information, which is rooted in the market imperfection in China.

This study has at least two important implications for financial education and market
efficiency studies. First, identifying the traits of vulnerable groups is undoubtedly a
necessary step before policies can be designed to cater for them. This is important for
social equality and social welfare as a whole. Identifying the traits of potential losers
also makes it possible to improve the investment performance of vulnerable groups.
Vulnerable groups can become better off if they are aware of their vulnerability in
advance and take action to overcome their intrinsic difficulties. For example, the
findings suggest that female investors are more likely to underperform as a result of
their reluctance to cut their losses. Financial education programmes should cater for
this rule by trying to alert women to this disposition effect. Second, whether losers
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are irrational is an important question that cannot be answered without knowing their
characteristics, preferences and behaviour. If the behaviour of underperforming stock
market investors not only harms their own benefits but also undermines market
efficiency, the task of identifying their features would be of significant importance
for asset pricing studies.

The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, I investigate the
determinants of stock investment return performance. I propose the hypotheses
derived from a theoretical analysis and then test them in empirical regressions. In
Section 3, I investigate the role of information screening preferences. I first
investigate the correlation between ISPs and investor characteristics, with an
emphasis on the variables identified as IP determinants in the previous section. Next,
I analyse the correlation between ISPs and investor mistakes. Then I discuss the
effect of ISP on IP. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Section 2. Determinants on Individual Stock Return Performance
I. Hypothesis
Which factors contribute to individual investors’ expected returns on their stock
portfolios? According to stand portfolio theory, if a stock portfolio is optimal, only
the investor’s specific risk preference and constraints matter. Risk preference is
shown to be associated with individual characteristics such as gender and wealth.
Constraints usually result from information asymmetry, which is related to investors’
access to information and the ability to access useful information. In this context, we
should expect risk tolerance preference, gender, wealth, education level and other
variables that contribute to information cost to play a role in individual stock
investment performance. Alternatively, investors may fail to optimise their portfolios
by making mistakes such as exposing themselves to specific risks rather than fully
diversifying, inappropriately keeping losers rather than rebalancing and so on. These
investor mistakes contribute to the under-performance of investments. Therefore, we
should also expect investors’ behavioural biases to affect their stock investment
performance. In sum, according to theory, I hypothesize that factors associated with
investors’ risk preferences, constraints and behavioural mistakes will be correlated
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with stock investment performance, which is represented in the following descriptive
model:
𝑀𝑀

𝑁𝑁

𝑚𝑚=2

𝑛𝑛=𝑀𝑀+1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

AR: expected annual return of individual investor’s stock portfolio
Risk tolerance: investor’s risk tolerance level

Constraint: factor revealing investor’s constraint when optimizing stock portfolio
Mistake: investor behavioral bias that diver him/ her from optimization

In the dataset, risk preference is measured by respondents’ self-reported attitude to
risk. According to standard theory, it is expected to positively correlate with expect
return; therefore,
Hypothesis I: 𝛽𝛽1 > 0
Regarding constraints, it is clear that having limited information is an important
resource. Several variables in the dataset reveal individual heterogeneity with respect
to information accessibility, such as city of residence, working industry and access to
the Internet, and information costs such as education level, financial knowledge and
so on. The more constraints an investor has, the lower his/her expected return will be.
Hypothesis II: 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 < 0
Investors may make mistakes that are detrimental to their performance. Two
variables in the dataset roughly measure two common mistakes: under-diversification
and the disposition effect. The hypothesis predicts that the extent of the investment
mistake will be negatively correlated with return performance.
Hypothesis III: 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 < 0
II. Measuring individual stock investment performance
The dependent variable of interest is individual stock investment performance. The
dataset provides the non-risk-adjusted holding period return rates for individual stock
investments during two sample periods. Sample period I covers the 6-month period
from March to September 2009, and sample period II covers the 3-year period from
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October 2006 to September 2009.

The holding period return rates are the paper return rates for the two sample periods,
respectively. Specifically, the holding period return rate for sample period I is named
HPR 1 and that for sample period II is named HPR 2 . The values of the shares in
households’ stockholdings at the time of the survey are also available in the data set,
which enables us to distinguish not-reported HPR 1 values from zero HPR 1 values in
households with no stockholdings.

Of the 10,043 survey respondents, 2,030 reported either their HPR 1 or HPR 2 , or both.
Forty-two investors were newcomers to the stock market within the last half year. I
exclude these new stock market participants and restrict the sample to those who
reported at least 3-year-period return rates. This restriction, which does not
materially change the results, prevents the distribution from being unduly influenced
by investors whose returns are driven by only a few months of realisations. Moreover,
86 investors who had previously invested in stock had quit the market for at least 6
months. The HPR 1 value for these householders is zero because holding zero shares
is also a state of stock investment. As borrowing is uncommon in China, I exclude 10
observations with HPRs of less than -100% to avoid the results being influenced by
potential measurement errors. This restriction also causes no material difference to
the findings. Finally, there are 1,906 observations for HPR 1 and 1,980 observations
for HPR 2 .
The annualised return rate is then computed based on HPR 1 and HPR 2 and labelled
as AR 1 and AR 2 , respectively. Moreover, I create two dummy variables, ‘Loser 1 ’ and
‘Loser 2 ’, to indicate whether an investor loses money in sample period I and sample
period II, respectively. In the 6-month period, 51.52% of investors lost money
compared with 65.61% in the 3-year period. The details of these IP measures can be
found in Appendix 3, Panel D and the descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3,
Panel B. Meanwhile, Figure 3 and 4 plot the distribution of them.
III. Regression Result
Panel A of Table 5-1 reports the regression of IP on a variety of potential
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determinants of return performance. In columns (I) the dependent variable is AR 1
and in columns (II) it is AR 2 . AR i refers to the annualised non-risk-adjusted return
performance of investors’ stock portfolios during the sample period, i. For the
independent variables, I include all available factors that may be related to investors’
risk preferences, information constraints and abilities. Detailed variables concerning
investors’ employment status, job position, industry and city of residence are
controlled for but not reported in the table to save space.

Many variables contribute to investor constraint. It is widely accepted in the
literature that the amount of an individual’s total assets is positively linked with
his/her access to information and negatively associated with information cost. The
wealth effect is significant in both regressions in Table 5-1, Panel A. In sample
period I, every 100 thousand increase in total asset value leads to a 7% rise in the
annual expected return. The wealth effect is not significant in sample period II when
the stock market is highly volatile and far from efficient. Ethnicity and education
level are also related to investor constraint because they contribute to information
asymmetry or information cost heterogeneities. Education level is positively
correlated with IP, and the higher investors’ educational attainments, the higher their
average IP in both sample periods. Notably, university graduates achieved 15.69%
higher annual return rates in sample period I than investors with a lower than high
school level of education. This difference is significant at the 5% confidence level.

It is notable that in an unreported regression, similar to that in Table 5-1, Panel A
column (I) but without controlling for investor mistakes, female investors earn 6.35%
less AR 1 than males. The effect is significant at the 10% confidence level. This effect
is almost as high as a 10,000 RMB decrease in household total assets. The coefficient
for female is also negative in sample period II, although it is not significant. This
implies that female investors are vulnerable in terms of return performance as a
consequence of their propensity to make mistakes. Ethnic minority investors seem to
gain less than Han investors, but the effect is significant only in sample period II.

The coefficient of Risk Tolerance in model (I) is significantly positive, indicating that
the more risk an investor is willing to take, the higher his/her return rate on average.
38

This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis. This effect is not significant in
sample period II, when the stock market was volatile during the global financial
crisis. This is an abnormal phenomenon: even risk taking was not compensated by a
risk premium, which implies that the stock market in China during the financial crisis
seriously lacked efficiency.

I also include all of the job satisfaction measures in the regression to see if they have
any influence on stock market investment performance at all. It turns out that they
are all insignificant. Such a finding is perhaps not surprising as job satisfaction
measures are intended to capture barriers to participation, such as background risk or
participation cost, which are not theoretically predicted to be correlated with
performance. There is, therefore, little reason to assume that investor behaviour and
performance are subject to the same causes as stock investment involvement. In sum,
although job satisfaction plays a role in stock market participation, its correlation
with investment performance is theoretically ambiguous and empirically
insignificant.

Theoretically speaking, under-diversification and keeping losers are biased forms of
behaviour that lead to under-optimal performance. In China, these two so-called
mistakes do indeed harm investors’ return performance. The under-diversification
effect is represented by the product of the number of equity holdings in the portfolio,
minus one. The lower the number of stocks included in the portfolio, the lower the
expected return on the portfolio. The question, ‘Do you use a cut-loss strategy when
trading shares, i.e. sell a share when its price drops below a certain level and the
market prospects for this share are not good?’ roughly reflects the disposition effect.
Respondents chose one of three response options: ‘Execute it strictly’, ‘Execute it
occasionally’ or ‘Never do’. The ‘Execute it strictly’ option reflects the lowest level
of disposition, and ‘Never do’ reflects the highest level. The regression results show
that for every one point increase in Disposition Effect, the expected return drops by
about 12% in sample period I and 3% in sample period II. Both effects are significant
at the 1% confidence level.

In sum, all of the empirical evidence supports the above hypotheses: high risk
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tolerance is associated with high expected returns; greater constraints resulting from
less access to information or higher information cost decrease expected returns; and
making investment mistakes harms return performance.
IV. Self-selection bias argument
In the regressions above, only about 20% of the observations in the sample are
included because the rest of the households do not participate in the stock market at
all. If households chose not to invest stock because they believed that they would
perform badly in this market, the sample of observed IP may suffer from selection
bias. Therefore, it is necessary to check whether and to what extent such a selection
bias may affect the results. For this, the Heckman selectivity model is used.

For the first step in running the Heckman selectivity model, valid instrumental
variables are required. These IV should qualify as determinants of stock market
participation but not of investment performance. Variables relating to job satisfaction
seem to be good candidates. As discussed in the previous chapter, job satisfaction in
general affects stock acquisition. It was also noted that one of the main reasons that
job satisfaction plays a role in stock market participation is its association with
background risk. However, there is no reason to believe that people with low
background risk should necessarily perform better in the stock market. In fact, the
results shown in Table 5-1, Panel B clearly indicate that several job satisfaction
variables are indeed associated with participation but not with performance. Hence,
these can be used as valid instrumental variables for the Heckman selectivity model.

I specify the Heckman selectivity model as follows:
𝑀𝑀

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜇𝜇1𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚=1

IP is observed only if
𝑀𝑀

𝑁𝑁

𝑚𝑚=1

𝑛𝑛=𝑀𝑀+1

𝛾𝛾0 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑖𝑖 > 0

where

𝜇𝜇1 ~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎)
𝜇𝜇2 ~𝑁𝑁(0,1)
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𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1 , 𝜇𝜇2 ) = 𝜌𝜌

the null hypothesis for no selectivity is:
𝜌𝜌 = 0
The results of the estimation of the Heckman selectivity model are presented in Table
5-1, Panel C. As can be seen, no matter whether AR 1 or AR 2 is used as the proxy for
IP, 𝜌𝜌 is never significantly different from zero. If the IV variables used here are

valid, these results indicate that the selectivity bias is not a major concern in our data.
Hence, the OLS results can be considered reliable.

Section 3. Information Screening Preference and Individual Stock Return
Performance
In the previous section, I made an initial attempt to investigate how individual stock
investment return performance is affected by a range of investor characteristics and
behaviour, which are determinants established in literature. In this section, I try a
new angle–the role of information screening preferences (ISPs) in IP. The estimations
would be biased if the variables reflecting information screening preference are
directly added into previous regression, when the multicollinearity problem would be
so serious that the coefficient of total assets inflates to about 200. Then to identify the
exact effects of IPSs and their channels, in this section, I run the regressions of IP on
information screening preference with and without controls, and carefully interpret
the results.
I. Information Screening Preferences (ISPs)
In the survey, respondents were asked ‘How do you weight the importance of the
following factors when you make investment decisions: personal experience; own
analysis; consultants advice; peer opinion; or grapevine news?’ The results illustrate
that preference for information resources is associated with some investor
characteristics and is predictive of behavioural bias. Preferences for these
information resources are likely to be associated with self-confidence. Intuitively,
confident individuals tend to listen to themselves while unconfident ones are more
willing to listen to others.
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Specifically, ‘own analysis’ has the highest correlation with the objective ability to
make correct decisions and the subjective confidence in such ability. Reliance on
‘personal experience’ also partly measures self-confidence. The implication of
listening to ‘consultant advice’ is ambiguous now that the trustworthiness of
consultants is doubtful, especially in China. Valuing ‘peer opinion’ is associated with
the so-called peer effect, for which there is some evidence in the literature. Most
previous studies claim that the peer effect is a behavioural bias that harms investment
performance. Last but not least, listening to ‘grapevine news’ has mixed implications:
it has the lowest correlation with stock analysis ability, yet it may also reflect
confidence in one’s ability to access private information, which brings an advantage.
II. Information Screening Preference and Investor Characteristics
To investigate how Information Screening Preference is associated with investor
characteristics, I regress this variable on a host of individual demographic and
socio-economic characteristics. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 5-2. The
constant and a variety of insignificant control variables are included in the regression
but are not reported to save space. From the table, we can see that females have a
significant preference for listening to other people, whether family member, friend or
grapevine news, rather than trusting their own judgments. Gender is the only factor
that is significantly related to personal investment experience. In sum, women appear
reluctant to trust their own experience.

Wealthy investors prefer their own analysis and high-income investors distrust
consultants’ views. Interestingly, the educational-level dummy does not have a
consistent effect on information preference. The only finding is that investors with
the highest education appear to be subject to the peer effect. A possible explanation
of this phenomenon is that high-IQ investors interact more. Grinblatt, Keloharju, and
Linnainmaa (2012) find that investors are more likely to herd with investors of a
similar IQ than with investors of a dissimilar IQ. The opinions of average- or low-IQ
investors vary considerably, whereas the opinions of high-IQ investors are more
consistent: they exhibit superior market timing, stock-picking skill and trade
execution.
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I control a series of variables reflecting investors’ information constraints or ability to
exploit information: Financial Literacy Dummy, Financial Centre Dummy, Finance
Sector Dummy and Internet Access Dummy. Unsurprisingly, these variables have
opposite effects on the importance scores for ‘own analysis’ and ‘grapevine news’.
Residing in a financial centre increases the score for the importance of ‘own analysis’
by 0.125 points and decreases that for ‘grapevine news’ by 0.107 points on the
five-point scale. Those with the basic knowledge that a ‘Financial crisis has ever
happened in history’ value ‘own analysis’ 0.212 points higher and ‘grapevine news’
0.207 points lower than those without such knowledge. Working in the finance sector
increases the importance score for ‘own analysis’ by 0.334 points and having access
to the Internet at home decreases the importance score for ‘grapevine news’ by 0.127
points.

Interestingly, managers, professionals and entrepreneurs rate the importance of
grapevine news 0.407 points higher and that of their own analysis 0.244 points lower,
reflecting their belief that they have advantages in access to private information.

The five information screening preferences can be categorised into two groups:
listening to self and listening to others. The difference between these two groups may
reflect investor confidence. I construct a variable, ‘Confidence’, indicating whether
investors prefer to listen themselves or to others when making financial decisions.
The dummy value is set to one for those who value their own analysis or past
investment more than each of the external information resources: consultant, family
and friend, and grapevine news.

I construct a new model by replacing the dependent variables in the regressions in
Table 5-2, Panel A with the dummy variable 5, Confidence. Table 5-2, Panel B reports
the regression of Confidence on the same independent variables as those in the Panel
A regressions. The stepwise regression identifies five variables that have statistically
significant associations with the Confidence dummy. The variables reflecting wealth,

5

The dummy variable Confidence takes the value of 1 when the highest score among all five types of
information resource is for either Personal Experience or Own Analysis, and 0 otherwise.
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easier access to information and stronger ability to use information are positively
correlated with the probability of trusting ones’ own views. Investors in management
positions are more likely to listen to others’ views, which may be due to managers
favouring grapevine news, as discussed above.
III. Information Screening Preference and Investor Mistakes
How is information resource preference associated with investor behavioural biases?
In Table 5-3, Panel A, I report the cross-sectional correlations between preferences
and behavioural factors. Personal Experience Preference and Own Analysis
Preference are both positively associated with willingness to execute the rational
cut-loss strategy. The correlation coefficients of these variables with Disposition
Effect are -0.05 and -0.06, respectively, significant at about or less than 1%
confidence level. Those who are subject to the peer effect also appear to be subject to
the disposition effect, as indicated by the highly significant correlation (0.101)
between Peer Opinion Preference and Disposition Effect. Under-diversification is
correlated with Investment Experience Preference, but only at the level of 10.4%.
This implies that the more investors value their own investment experience, the more
likely they are to diversify their stock portfolios. To summarise, some information
preferences in favour of own opinions are found to be associated with rational
investment strategies and some preferences in favour of others’ opinions are
associated with investor mistakes.

To confirm the above conclusion, I perform a t test on group differences for
Under-diversification and Disposition Effect with respect to the Confidence Dummy.
The results are shown in Table 5-3, Panel B. The difference in the Disposition Effect
between the listen-to-self group (Confidence Dummy=1) and the listen-to-others
group (Confidence Dummy=0) is significant at the 1.9% level. The difference in the
Under-diversification is almost significant, with a p-value equal to 11.2%.
IV. Information Screening Preference and Stock Investment Performance
To investigate the relationship between information screening preferences and stock
investment performance, I adopt three groups of models to estimate the effects. They
are as the following:
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Model (I) and (IV):
𝑀𝑀

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚=1

Model (II) and (V)
𝑁𝑁

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛=𝑀𝑀+1

Model (III) and (VI):
𝑀𝑀

𝑁𝑁

𝑚𝑚=1

𝑛𝑛=𝑀𝑀+1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

AR refers to the expected annual return of individual investors’ stock portfolios, ISP
refers to information screening preference and IM refers to the determinants of IP
identified in the previous section; t takes the value of 1 or 2 to indicate sample
periods I and II.

The results of the regressions clearly show that investors with greater trust in
themselves earn more in terms of their stock annual return rates, as reported in Table
5-4. As shown in Panel A, all of the coefficients for information screening
preferences in favour of own opinion are positive in all of the models, and all those
in favour of others’ opinions are negative. Specifically, one unit increase in Own
Analysis Preference is associated with a 5.05% higher return rate in AR 1 , which is an
impressively large effect. In contrast, a one unit increase in Peer Opinion Preference
is associated with a 0.76% lower return rate in AR 2 . Table 5-4, Panel B provides an
even clearer picture: the effect of the Confidence Dummy is consistently positive
across models and sample periods.

Overall, what can be concluded about the information screening preference effects?
Are they new, independent and fundamental determinants of IP, or are they merely
the results of the previously identified IP determinants? Table 5-2 already shows that
ISP is correlated with some investor characteristics, and, in an unreported regression,
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preferences for personal investment experience and own analysis are positively and
significantly correlated with risk tolerance. As shown in Table 5-4, Panel A, in
sample period I the effects of ISP, Risk preference, Education and Wealth are
significant in models (I) or (II). But in model (III), the first three ones simultaneously
disappear and t value of Total Asset is seriously inflated. The situation in sample
period II is similar. Given these findings, it is safe to reject the possibility that the ISP
effect is independent. Investors with greater wealth and higher levels of education
and risk-tolerance are more likely to trust themselves when assessing the importance
of information according to its source, and thus achieve better return performance.
Their outperformance is partly attributed to making fewer investor mistakes, which is
partly due to their information-screening preference.
Section 4. Conclusion
The main findings in the current chapter are as follows. First, as predicted by
standard theory, variables reflecting investor constraints and mistakes influence
individual stock investment performance. Regarding investor constraints, I find that
the more constraints an investor is subject to, the lower the return rate on his/her
stock portfolio. Poor, less-educated and intrinsically nervous investors underperform
significantly, which I argue is because these investors bear higher information costs.
Moreover, two so-called ‘investor mistakes’ indeed undermine stock investment
outcomes, as predicted by theory and recognised in the literature.

In addition,

evidence from the April to September 2009 period shows that high risk tolerance was
accompanied by high returns, but this was not the case for the October 2006 to
September 2009 period, during which the market was very inefficient.

Second, I study investor performance from a new angle, preference for information
screening with respect to resources, and find that investors who rely on their own
analysis when making trading decisions earn more. Specifically, preference on own
investment experience, own analysis shows positively correlation with investment
performance and trust on view of financial consultants, family or friends, and
grapevine news are negatively associated with individual stock investment
performance, although not all the correlations are significant. The self-trusting
investors are usually wealthier, have more financial knowledge and are more likely
46

to be male. Evidence regarding their behavioural biases shows that they are less
vulnerable to the disposition effect. These findings imply that agents with more
information constraints are less capable of making trading decisions by themselves;
consequently, they listen to others and make more mistakes. It is interesting that
people in managerial positions tend to trust grapevine news, a preference for which is
actually negatively correlated with IP, although not significantly. A possible
explanation is that managers in China are overconfident in their ability to access
insider information. Such a belief or the illusion of owning privilege is deeply rooted
in Chinese culture today.

Admittedly, this study has some limitations. In particular, underperformance in only
two periods is not enough to prove the consistency of effects across time. Therefore,
I would expect to use panel data for future research. As for future studies, the
findings in this chapter ignite my interest in investor rationality, which is a more
complex topic. Is stock ownership necessarily rational? I believe that rational
behaviour could be specific to individuals. If certain groups of individuals are highly
likely to lose out on stock investments, then shunning the stock market could be a
rational decision for them: gaining a low positive return rate is better than a negative
return rate. In short, I hope to contribute to the normative household finance
literature by seeking reasonable criteria for investor rationality in my future work.
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Chapter 6. Trait Anxiety Effect
Section 1. Introduction
It is not unreasonable to claim that personality can affect investor performance.
Theories in personality psychology have long demonstrated that personality traits
such as neuroticism can affect human performance. Indeed, a large body of existing
research has identified a negative correlation between neuroticism/anxiety and job
performance (Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991; Salgado, 1997). Accepting that
investing in stocks is as cognitively demanding a task as performing a job, it is
intuitive to hypothesize that a facet of trait neuroticism, trait anxiety, can also
influence individual stock investment performance. However, empirical evidence is
needed to verify this hypothesis.

The study of the link between trait anxiety (TA) and investment performance (IP) can
contribute to the existing literature in the following three ways. First, in recent years,
there has been a surge of studies in behavioural finance that have examined the
effects of inherent individual heterogeneity on financial performance. For example,
several recent studies have investigated to what extent particular factors related to
personality such as genetic makeup, IQ, cognitive ability, sociability and trust can
affect stock investment behavior or performance (Barnea, Cronqvist, & Siegel, 2010;
Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2012; Grinblatt, Keloharju, & Linnainmaa, 2012). It is therefore
worthwhile to explore the association between a specific personality trait and
financial performance. Second, the finding that some personality traits are associated
with stock investment performance is potentially important for the emerging
household finance literature. This branch of the literature holds that how well
individuals or households invest in financial markets has important implications for
their own welfare and for the welfare of society as a whole (Campbell, 2006). Hence,
establishing that certain personality traits can affect the performance of financial
investments can help us to identify the potentially vulnerable groups and
consequently enable the design of suitably targeted public policies. Third, this study
makes an innovation in methodology. Psychologists have been studying individual
personality traits for a long time and have developed many useful theories and
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collected much empirical (often experimental) evidence. Some of the theories
relating to personality traits can help us to better predict individual behaviours,
including those related to financial activities. Hence, introducing these theories to the
finance or economics field will certainly help us to better understand the individual
heterogeneities in financial/economic questions.

Measure of trait anxiety (TA) is needed to assess whether TA actually affects
individual stock investment return performance (IP). Large sample data on TA is rare,
not mention it has to be companied with a host of variables about investor
characteristics,

preferences,

behaviors

and

performances.

However,

as

aforementioned, I use a unique dataset. An important advantage of this dataset is that
it was collected immediately after the outbreak of the global financial crisis (GFC).
The participants in the survey were asked questions on their subjective feelings about
the GFC (state anxiety or SA) and on the effects of the GFC on their income, wealth,
work pressure and job security (stimuli for SA). Hence, using the GFC as a natural
experimental setting, the data enabled us to develop a good measure of the extent to
which someone is more or less prone to anxiety. I believe this measure is a good
proxy for TA because it is conceptually consistent and performs well empirically in
all of the validity check tests.

My main finding in this chapter is that the proxy for TA is significantly negatively
correlated with IP, as predicted in theory. Furthermore, the robustness check rules out
the probability that this association is due to reverse causality. I also find that the
result holds after controlling for a long list of factors that may potentially affect IP.
This suggests that PTA measures a fundamental personality trait that can affect a
person’s behaviour when performing a cognitively demanding task such as investing
in the stock market. This finding has wide range implications for research in the
fields of behavioural and household finance and economic psychology.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I construct the measure
for Trait Anxiety and discuss its validity. Section 3 presents empirical regression of
individual performance (IP) on PTA as well as the robust checks. Section 4 concludes
the study.
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Section 2. Theory
Psychologists have long established that anxiety impairs performance on difficult
tasks (Eysenck, 1982; Saltz & Hoehn, 1957; Zeidner, 1998) and there is abundant
evidence on the negative association between neuroticism or trait anxiety and job
performance (Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991; Salgado, 1997). Furthermore, stock
investment activity is a complex, highly cognitively demanding task, analogous to a
job 6. Given the above theories, evidence and facts, it is natural to conjecture that trait
anxiety impairs stock investment performance. In this section, I introduce the
theoretical background for this conjecture. The theories are mainly borrowed from
psychology.
Anxiety and Performance
The mainstream studies in psychology linking anxiety and performance use a
cognitive approach. The ‘cognitive pattern’ of anxiety has two aspects: performance
impairment on cognitively demanding tasks, and selective attention towards
threatening stimuli. Both of these clearly indicate that anxiety harms task
performance when the task is difficult, especially when uncertainty is involved.

Psychologists find that anxiety impairs performance on cognitively demanding tasks.
Eysenck and Calvo (1992) points out that anxiety about the task interferes with
performance by overloading attention or working memory. Active working memory
is one of the cognitive functions most sensitive to anxiety: worry-related processing
uses up working capacity. In addition, Sarason, Sarason, and Pierce (1995) propose
that anxiety may divert attentional resources from the task at hand to worry-related
processing, resulting in an insufficiency of resources for the task at hand. Figure 5
presents an outline of this model. Attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan,
Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011) represents a major
development of Eysenck and Calvo (1992) processing efficiency theory and it has
become the most influential cognitive theory in this domain. The theory proposes
6

This intuition is consistent with the evidence from Chapter 4, Section 3, which implies that stock investment is
an activity analogue to taking a job from the perspective of making a decision about participation.
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that anxiety decreases attentional control and causes a disproportional allocation of
cognitive resources. The theory assumes that anxiety impairs the efficient
functioning of the goal-directed attentional system and increases the extent to which
processing is influenced by the stimulus-driven attentional system (Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).

Anxiety is also associated with a bias in selective attention and similar biases in
judgment and reasoning. Individuals with high trait anxiety show a bias towards
attending to threatening stimuli (Matthews & Harley, 1996; Egloff & Hock, 2001). In
the context of decision-making, anxiety changes the way the person frames the
problem and inappropriately allocates superfluous attention to threats and
self-protective strategies (Nabi, 2003).

The above theories on cognition and attentional bias have important implications for
individual investment performance. The ‘cognition’ stream claims that anxious
investors have a shortage of cognitive resources when making trading decisions. In
this context, anxious investors are less likely to optimise their utility and more likely
to make mistakes, thus their investment underperformance is a natural consequence
of under-optimisation. Meanwhile, risk aversion is a key parameter in portfolio
theory, according to which investors choose the level of risk exposure that directly
determines the expected return on their portfolios. However, investors are not
necessarily capable of picking assets with their preferred risk level because risk
aversion has two components – risk perception and risk attitude – and risk perception
could be mistaken. In other words, what an investor perceives is not necessarily the
same as the reality. As mentioned above, ‘attentional bias’ theories inform us that
anxiety causes a negative perception bias; therefore, financial risks perceived by
anxious investors should be consistently higher than the actual risks. Consequently,
anxious investors take lower risks than they would prefer, and this is paired with
expected returns lower than they would prefer. As a result, the returns on anxious
investors’ portfolios are lower than they would be if they were not anxious.
Personality traits and facets
Anxiety could be a trait or state (Eysenck, 1982; Spielberger, 1966). In the current
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study my interest is focused on trait anxiety because it is stable and thus can be used
to predict future behaviour. Personality traits have power in predicting human
behaviour and consequent performance. For example, those who score highly on the
personality trait neuroticism are more likely to interpret ordinary situations as
threatening and to interpret minor frustrations as hopelessly difficult. Their negative
emotional reactions tend to persist for an unusually long time, which means they are
often in a bad mood. In short, high neuroticism scores explain and predict a
pessimistic approach towards work.

According to personality psychology, trait anxiety is a facet of the neuroticism
dimension of the Costa and McCrae’s ‘Big Five’ personality model 7, which has
become the most influential model of personality over the past few decades.
Personality can be described at the primary and broader trait levels. Broader traits are
often called dimensions or domains. Costa and McCrae (1992a) recognise five
personality dimensions: neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and
conscientiousness. Neuroticism is the tendency to experience negative emotions such
as anger, anxiety and depression. It is sometimes called emotional instability, and the
converse is referred to as emotional stability. According to Eysenck (1968),
neuroticism is associated with low tolerance for stress or aversive stimuli. Beneath
personality traits, there are facets, which refer to specific and unique aspects of a
broader personality trait. For the personality domain neuroticism, Costa and McCrae
(1992a) introduce six constituent facets: anxiety, angry hostility, depression,
self-consciousness, impulsiveness and vulnerability. The anxiety facet, i.e. so-called
trait anxiety, reflects a stable predisposition or tendency to respond with state anxiety.
In addition, facets in same dimension are proven to be in line with each other.
Anxiety Trait and State
Psychological theory on the relationship between trait and state anxiety is the basis of
my methodology for constructing a proxy for trait anxiety, which is described in
Section 3.

7

There are many versions of five factor model including lexical versions and questionnaire-based versions.
Among them, Costa and McCrae’s version is the most famous.
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Figure 6 shows a simplified version of Spielberger (1966) state-trait model of anxiety
proposed by Eysenck (1982) as an explanation for the effects of anxiety on
performance. This theory clearly demonstrates that traits, together with situational
factors such as external stressors, influence the state. Hence, given identical external
situations, the variance in state anxiety should be explained by internal trait anxiety,
which is heterogeneous in a population.

To sum up, from psychology theories direct to the proposition that trait anxiety
negatively affects performance when the task is difficult, especially when uncertainly
involved. In addition, these theories are supported by numerous empirical evidences.
The most relevant one to my study is Salgado (2002), which shows how personality
measured by the Five Factor model can influence the job performance of the
financial service managers. They have one single scale for measuring global job
performance and two separate measures for components of Job performance, job
problem solving ability and job motivation. Their results show that Neuroticism
negatively correlated with both the global measure of job performance and the two
components. Other related empirical studies include Mueller and Plug (2006) who
find emotional stability (low neuroticism) increase men’s earnings. Neuroticism is
also negatively associated with the wages of men and women in the Netherlands.
(Nyhus & Pons, 2005).
Section 3. Measuring Trait Anxiety
The main objective of this study is to investigate the effect of personality trait anxiety
on individual stock investment performance. Given the absence of trait anxiety
scores obtained from formal psychological testing, I require a proxy variable that is
conceptually close to the psychological term trait anxiety. For this purpose, I
construct a variable named PTA that measures each investor’s intrinsic propensity to
feel anxiety, worry, fear or unease. I begin by estimating a model and then derive
PTA from the residual of this model. Next, I test the validity of PTA as a proxy for
trait anxiety.
I. Constructing PTA
According to Spielberger (1966) and Spielberger and Reheiser (2004), trait anxiety
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(TA) is ‘a general predisposition to experience transient states of anxiety’ while state
anxiety (SA) is defined primarily as a consciously perceived feeling of tension and
apprehension. Inner trait anxiety interacts with External Stressor to determine state
anxiety. The above can be translated into the following model:
SA = External Stressor + Internal Trait Anxiety

SA and a rich amount of data on variables relating to External Stressor are available
in the dataset. This means that I can run a regression of SA on a set of variables that
captures as many as possible of the observed stimuli for SA, and then use the
residual of this regression as a proxy for TA.

In the first step I calculate each investor’s relative level of state anxiety using the
survey questions on their feelings towards the 2007 global financial crisis (GFC). In
the survey, respondents were asked how uneasy/nervous/worried/fearful they felt
about the global financial crisis (See Appendix 2 Q9-1, Q9-2, Q9-3, Q9-4). As
Cronbach’s alpha shows a high level of inner consistency in the answers to these four
questions, I average the scores for the four questions into a single index, SA 8, and
use it as a proxy for state anxiety. In the second step, I run the regression with the
following model specification and name its residual PTA or PTA2.
𝑀𝑀

𝑁𝑁

𝑚𝑚=1

𝑛𝑛=𝑀𝑀+1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 � + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

Table 6-1 reports the results of the regressions. The dependent variable SA in both
regressions is the scalar constructed using the Cronbach's alpha method from the
group of scales 9 measuring individuals’ unease, nervousness, worry and fear about
the GFC, as described above. The scale reliability coefficient is 0.8666. The same
independent variables are used in both regressions. I try to include as many variables
as possible, as long as they represent objective effects and external situations and are
not closely correlated with inherent personality, either theoretically or empirically,
8

For distribution of SA, see Table 3 Panel C and Figure 7.

9

See Appendix 2, Relevant Questions from the Household Survey on Financial Services Demand in
China, Q9-1, 2, 3 and 4.
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because controlling for environmental factors reduces the noise from external factors
in the residual. Problems such as heterosedasticity and multicollinearity should not
be a concern as they will not undermine the consistency of the estimation. In this
context, as long as a variable is not correlated with trait anxiety and carries some
information about the external environment, it is included in the regression. Finally,
about 60 variables are included, measuring the effect of the GFC on substantial items,
demographic characteristics except gender, socio-economic status, financial
knowledge and how respondents weighted the importance of nine considerations
when answering the survey. Details of the independent variables are provided in
Appendix 3. Note that I do not include Female and the measure of IP in the model,
because gender is correlated with neuroticism (Lynn & Martin, 1997), and IP is
assumed to be correlated with TA.

Both a median regression model (Specification (I) Quantile regression) and a mean
regression model (Specification (II) OLS regression) are used to construct the proxy
variable for trait anxiety, named PTA and PTA2, respectively. Comparing the models,
I find that PTA is more desirable for three reasons. First, the quantile regression
model is a least-absolute-value model. As the absolute value of distance is my focus,
it is conceptually superior to the least-squares-value model for my purpose. Second,
the quantile regression estimates are more robust against outliers in the response
measurements. Third, in the following section, which reports the external validity
and endogeneity tests, PTA performs slightly better than PTA2. Nevertheless, the
evidence from the above tests illustrates that the model specification does not make
any material difference to the findings. In this context, I report both regressions for
SA in Table 6-1, and in the following sections, I only report the PTA regressions.

It is clear that PTA measures whether an individual’s state anxiety about the GFC is
higher/lower than that of the median, other things being equal. It measures an
individual’s relative level of anxiety compared with that of other individuals in the
same situation. Consistent with the sample size used for the regression in Table 6-1,
the PTA sample comprises 9,218 observations. The distribution of PTA is graphed in
Figure 8, with the normal distribution curve for reference. The median of PTA is
around zero while the mean is not, because the quantile regression is estimated by
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minimising the sum of the squared distance of observations to the conditional median.
More specifically, the moments of PTA are as follows: mean 0.002, variance 0.474,
skewness -0.015 and kurtosis 3.484.
II. PTA as Proxy for Trait Anxiety
In regression examining the relationship between this intrinsic personality trait and
personal investment outcome, how well could PTA serve as a proxy for trait anxiety?
To be a good proxy, the variable PTA has to satisfy two assumptions:
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑣𝑣

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑣𝑣, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) =0

(1)
(2)

First, the correlation between PTA and TA should be positive and strong; otherwise,
PTA does not measure TA. Second, Noise should not be closely correlated with
investment performance; otherwise, the effect of TA on IP will be unidentifiable due
to the reverse causality problem. Hence, I conduct a validity check on assumption (1)
and an endogeneity check on assumption (2).
Validity check
One way of showing how much PTA reflects true TA is to examine how PTA is
correlated with a wide range of other proxies for neuroticism. According to the Five
Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992a; McCrae & Costa, 1999; McCrae & John,
1992) of personality, neuroticism is one of the trait dimensions of personality, which
can be further subcategorised into several facets, one of which is trait anxiety. Those
facets should be correlated with each other in a certain direction. For instance, if a
person scores highly on anxiety (tense), s/he is much more likely to score highly on
other facets of neuroticism, such as vulnerability (not confident), depression (not
contented), impulsiveness (moody), angry hostility (irritable) and self-consciousness
(shy). Furthermore, theories on neuroticism and numerous empirical studies indicate
that neuroticism is negatively correlated with optimism, which is also testable given
the data.

The informative dataset contains 19 variables that are intuitively expected to be
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related to neuroticism. I run a regression of PTA on all 19 variables. The sign of the
regression coefficients on each of these 17 variables is the same as the theoretical
prediction, and 15 of the 17 coefficients are statistically significant. For details, see
Table 6-2, External Validity Check on PTA, which summarises the results from 15
regressions of a variety of dependent variables on PTA. Now let us take ‘Satisfaction
with Interpersonal Relationships’ as an example. Intuitively, interpersonal
relationships with co-workers should not have a direct correlation with the effects of
the global financial crisis. However, according to personality psychology, people’s
subjective feelings about both relationships and the GFC depend on an individual’s
personality: for the former, the higher a person scores on the depression facet of
neuroticism, the less satisfied he or she should be; for the latter, the higher a person
scores on the anxiety facet of neuroticism, the more he or she should feel anxious
about the GFC. Psychological theory informs us that facets of neuroticism are
consistent; therefore, a person who scores high on the depression facet will usually
also score high on the anxiety facet. Therefore, if PTA is a good proxy of TA, we
should find that higher PTA scores are associated with less satisfaction with
interpersonal relationships with co-workers. As shown in Table 6-2, this prediction is
supported by the regression results for ‘Relationships with co-workers’. The
coefficient is -0.0234, with a t-statistic as large as -2.14. In summary, this evidence
provides no reason to doubt the validity of PTA, and neither does the evidence from
the other 14 regressions. From the results of all 15 tests, I have strong evidence to
confirm that PTA is a valid proxy for trait anxiety.
Endogeneity check: Structure among groups
From Section 3.1, we know that PTA is derived from state anxiety. In this context, it
is natural to question whether PTA is sufficiently distinct from state anxiety.
Theoretically speaking, state anxiety could be subject to IP, but trait anxiety should
be absolutely exogenous; in other words, assumption (2) must stand. Recall the
assumptions:
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑣𝑣

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑣𝑣, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) =0

(1)
(2)
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If the correlation between v and IP is highly significant, then PTA is not a suitable
proxy for TA because of the reverse causality problem. Luckily, proof by
contradiction can help us to verify assumption (2), although v is unobservable: if v,
namely the noise within PTA, is correlated with IP, then there should be a significant
group difference in PTA between the stockowner group and the non-stockowner
group because during the GFC, about 80% of stock investors lost money. Given this
additional stimulus, the SA of stockowners should be higher than that of
non-stockowners, other things being equal. In fact, the empirical evidence shows that
the group difference in SA is significant at the 1% level (t value = -2.6106). In this
context, if PTA contains a noise component that is subject to IP, then PTA should
exhibit the same group difference as SA. On the contrary, if there is no group
difference in PTA between stockowners and non-stockowners, the noise in PTA
cannot be closely related to IP. Then, PTA can serve as a proxy for TA without
worrying about the endogeneity problem.

To sum up, the decision rule is as follows:
If
then

Corr(v, IP) ≠0,

E(PTA|stockowner) ≠ E(PTA|nonstockowner)

This is equivalent to:
If
then

E(PTA|stockowner) = E(PTA|nonstockowner),
Corr(v, IP) =0

One-way analysis of variance shows that the group difference in PTA between
stockowners and non-stockowners is not significant even at the 10% level, and the t
value is as small as -1.5877. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
stockowners and non-stockowners do not differ with respect to their PTA score.
More formal tests can be found in Table 6-3. An OLS regression of PTA on the
Stock-owner Dummy shows an insignificant coefficient with a t-statistic of only 1.21.
To conclude, I find no evidence against Assumption (2).

Recall that I construct two proxies for individual trait anxiety, PTA and PTA2, from a
quintile regression and an OLS regression of SA on a host of situational variables. So
far I report the validity check and endogeneity check on PTA. Actually, the
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corresponding checks on PTA2, are also found to be valid and exogenous, although
not as good as PTA. To save space, I do not report them.

III. PTA Dummy Group
Expect for PTA and PTA2, I also construct a group of dummy variables reflecting TA,
which are constructed basing on PTA score. A full description of SA and all proxies
for TA are summarised in Appendix 3 Panel F.

Using one standard deviation from the mean of PTA as the criterion, I divide all
respondents into three groups. High PTA (HTA) group individuals have PTA scores
at least one standard deviation higher than the PTA mean; therefore, a typical HTA
group member could be described as an emotionally nervous person. Low PTA (LTA)
group individuals have PTA scores at least one standard deviation lower than the PTA
mean; therefore, a typical LTA group member could be described as an emotionally
stable person. The scores of the remaining individuals are between those of the HTA
and LTA groups and are categorised as the Middle PTA (MTA) group, which serves
as the reference group. HTA, LTA and MTA are dummy variables, coded as 1 to
indicate if an individual is a member of the High, Low or Middle PTA group,
respectively.
VI. Distinguish trait anxiety from risk aversion
In economics, risk aversion is a well-established term that refers to investors’
willingness to take risk for a risk premium. It is a revealed reference, measured as the
additional marginal reward that an investor requires to accept additional risk in
modern portfolio theory. Trait anxiety is a psychological term that captures an
individual’s propensity to feel anxious, nervous, fearful and worrisome. From their
definitions, these two concepts do not appear to be the same. However, it may be
argued that there are substantial overlaps in the underlying aspects of human nature
they are intended to capture.

Previous studies have established that risk aversion is correlated with wealth, income,
gender and education level. In contrast, trait anxiety is an intrinsic personality trait
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and should be independent from external factors, according to the Five Factor Model
of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992a; McCrae & Costa, 1999; McCrae & John,
1992). Thus, I hypothesise that the proxy for risk aversion and TA should be
correlated and uncorrelated, respectively, with demographic measures and financial
characteristics.

For evidence on the similarity/difference between trait anxiety and risk aversion, I
ran the three regressions shown in Table 6-4, where risk aversion is measured by the
survey respondents’ self-reported preference among risk-return pairs, and trait
anxiety uses PTA as a proxy. Column (I) reports the regression of risk aversion only
on PTA. The results indicate no significant correlation between these two variables.
Both the estimated coefficient and R square are close to zero. Column (II) also
reports a regression of risk aversion on PTA, but this time with a host of control
variables that are possible determinants of risk aversion based on the existing
literature. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, seven variables show significant
correlations with risk aversion with the correct signs, implying that having a higher
income, more knowledge or information and a more diversified background risk
effectively decrease an agent’s level of risk aversion. However, the coefficient on
PTA remains insignificant. In Column (III), I use PTA as a dependent variable. In this
regression, apart from age (which exhibits weak correlation), none of the other
variables show an association with PTA.

To summarise, although it seems intuitively plausible that trait anxiety should be
closely related to risk aversion, the evidence here shows that it is neither a proxy for
risk aversion nor a variable closely correlated with risk aversion.
Section 4. Effect of TA on IP
I. Regression Results
I investigate the paper return performance for each investor’s stock portfolio by
estimating cross-sectional regressions with the trait anxiety proxies and controls as
explanatory variables. I n Table 6-5, Panel A, PTA is used as a proxy for TA, while
in Panel B the HTA, LTA MTA dummy variables are used, with MTA as the
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reference group. In both panels, the dependent variables are measures of the sample
period performance of each investor’s stock portfolio. Specifications (I) and (III) in
both panels are for sample period I, from April to September 2009, and
Specifications (II) and (IV) are for sample period II, from September 2006 to 2009.

The regression results in Panel A reveal that PTA is negatively associated with
performance. For example, the annualised return rate in sample period I is reduced
by -9.90% per year for each one unit increase in PTA, which is measured on a scale
ranging from -2 to 2 with an approximately normal distribution. In an unreported
regression of HPR 1 , the corresponding 6-month HPR is reduced by -3.46%. For each
one-unit increase in PTA, the probability of losing money in this 6-month sample
period increases by about 11.9%. For the 36-month period coving the duration of the
global financial crisis, I find similar effects from Specifications (II) and (IV). The
annualised return 10 from 2006 to 2009, namely AR 2 , is -1.36% lower for each unit
increase in PTA, which increases the probability of losing money in this 36-month
period by 12.1%. In sum, the effect of PTA about the GFC on stock portfolio return
performance is consistently negative over the sample periods, and the magnitude of
the effect seems to be time sensitive. Both the sign and the magnitude of the PTA
effect on the probability of losing are almost the same in both sample periods. All of
the evidence in Panel A implies that high TA reduces expected IP.

In Panel B, I estimate the precise difference in IP between the high TA (PTA at least
one standard deviation higher than the sample mean) and low TA (PTA ate least one
standard deviation lower than the sample mean) investor groups, using the middle TA
(PTA no more than one standard deviation from the sample mean) group as the
reference group. I find that the AR 1 of the HTA group is -9.22% lower than that of
the MTA group. Although the effect seems persistently negative, there is wide
variation in its magnitude. In the 36-month sample period, this gap in AR is only
-1.53%. In contrast, a calm predisposition appears to bring an advantage to LTA
investors, whose IP is even higher than that of the MTA group. As a result, the gap
between the annualised return rates of HTA and LTA investors is as large as 10.76%

10
The corresponding holding period return in sample period II, HPR2, decreases by -3.55% for each unit increase
in PTA.
61

per year in sample period I and 2.91% in sample period II. The probability of HTA
investors failing to break even in both investment periods is not significant, but LTA
investors have a significant, 14.0% lower probability of losing money in sample
period I and 27.8% lower probability in sample period II.

There are several significant effects among the demographic and financial control
variables. Stock Portfolio Size stands out as having the most significant and robust
effect on IP. In both sample periods, a higher value of stock portfolio is associated
with a higher IP and a lower chance of losing money. Nevertheless, although the sign
of the Portfolio Size effect is persistent over time, its magnitude is as period sensitive
as that of PTA. For example, every 100 thousand RMB of stockholding increases
the expected annualised return rate by 6.30% in sample period I but only by 0.65%
in sample period II. Although not in all specifications, Total Asset and Total Family
Income are significant in most cases, and the positive slopes are consistent with the
literature. Finally, female household heads seems to be vulnerable investors in the
stock market.

All variables reflecting lower information constraints and higher ability to exploit
information have positive coefficients, which makes sense. In particular, I include a
group of dummy variables indicating respondents’ education level: Below Secondary
School Dummy, High School or Equivalent Dummy, Junior College Dummy, and
University Dummy, with the first group used as the reference group. Some of these
dummy variables exhibit significant effects. For example, in the 3-year sample
period, compared to investors with lower than high school levels of education, those
with a secondary school or equivalent level of education earn 1.76% more AR 2 and
are 19.0% less likely to lose money. Those with a bachelor or above degree earn even
more. In the 6-month sample period, their AR 1 is on average 11.15% higher than that
of the least-educated investors. In addition, respondents’ choices between the
risk-return pairs are associated with IP, which is not surprising.

62

II. Robustness check
Subsample Regression
An argument against the findings reported in the previous section could be that
investors with bad investment performance report high SA. As a variable taken from
SA, PTA may not be clean enough to be free from the reverse causality problem. To
check the problem, I run the same regression as that in Table 6-5, Panel A with a
subsample that excludes those investors who weight the consideration of stock price
as ‘important’ or ‘very important’ when reporting SA-relevant issues. As shown in
Table 6-6, Panel A, this rigid limitation on observers brings no material change to the
results. In the limited sample with only 1,243 (1,307) stock investors who are little
suspicious to endogeneity, the regression of AR 1 (AR 2 ) and Loser 1 (Loser 2 )
produces the same sign for all of the coefficients as for their counterparts in full
sample. Although there are some changes in the significance levels, the smallest
absolute t-statistic among all specifications is 2.36 and it is still significant at the 5%
significance level. To conclude, this check demonstrates that the finding regarding
PTA’s negative effect on IP is robust.
Regressions with Alternative Proxy for PTA
As mentioned in Section 2, I construct two proxies for TA: PTA is constructed from a
quintile regression and PTA2 is constructed from an OLS regression. Now, I replace
PTA with PTA2 and run the same regressions as in Table 6-5, Panel A. The results
are reported in Table 6-6, Panel B. Again, there are no substantial differences in the
findings. For each unit of increase in PTA2, the annualised return rate in sample
period I is reduced by -8.47% per year, and the corresponding annualised return rate
in sample period I is reduced by -1.21%. These two coefficients are significant at the
1% level. For each unit of increase in PTA2, the probability of losing money in the
6-month sample period increases by about 10.2%, and in the 36-month sample period
by about 11.0%. These two coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
Section 5. Conclusion
Using a natural experimental setting, I construct a proxy for trait anxiety, a facet of
neuroticism that has long been established in the psychology literature to be
63

associated with low job performance. This proxy for TA is shown to have a negative
effect on individual stock investment performance, and the robustness check
confirms that such an association is not due to endogeneity or reverse causality.

The current study leaves many questions to be answered in future research. First, I
have return rates for only two periods, which is not sufficiently strong to prove the
TA effect. A future study using panel data will solve this problem. Second, I identify
the effect of trait anxiety on IP, but provide little explanation of the channel. If
trading records become available in future, I will analyse the details of investor
trading behaviour to examine how high TA undermines their return performance.
Third, underperforming investors should, theoretically, learn and improve their
performance or quit in the long run. However, trait anxiety is an intrinsic part of
personality that is stable in adulthood. Therefore, how TA-vulnerable stock investors
behave in the long term is an interesting question. Such a study will require highly
quality trading records.

This finding provides an example of how the use of psychological theory or the study
of individual behaviour/personality can enrich our knowledge of finance and
economics. The behavioural finance literature contains a variety of interesting
correlations between everyday human behaviour and investment behaviour, but
makes little attempt explain them. For example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) and
Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) find that sociability contributes to stock market
participation. This may be evidence for an association between financial behaviour
and another personality trait, extroversion. The solid theoretical foundations
available in the personality psychology literature can help us to understand and
predict human behaviour, including financial behaviour.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
The household finance is an emerging new field in finance which studies how
households utilise financial instruments to fulfill their objectives. The topic of
household stock investment attracts more and more attention now as there are still
many gaps between theory and empirics in this area. Previous studies on household
stock investment find that the way some households use financial instruments is
consistent with theoretical predictions, but some fail to do so and consequently suffer
losses. The behaviour of the latter is therefore labelled as investor mistakes. The
makers of such mistakes tend to have lower incomes and education levels, and are
also more likely to be females or from ethnic minorities.

Campbell (2006) argues that investor mistakes are central to household finance
studies. However, some of these so-called mistakes may be due to our lack of
understand of household behaviors. Admittedly, given the complexity of financial
planning and often confusing financial products, households inevitably make
mistakes. However, to answer the question of whether any divergence from textbook
theoretical behaviour is indeed a mistake, we need to know what is optimal for each
household – knowledge that is not necessary fully taken into account from existing
financial theories. In fact, so far we do not have a satisfactory normative theory that
can tell us what households should do when contemplating stock market investments.
Should households participate in or stay out of the stock market? The answer should
be individual-specific, taking into account all transaction costs, opportunity costs and
comparative utility with respect to non-stock-ownership. Should investors fully
diversify their portfolios? The answer should depend on market efficiency, which has
never been and could never be perfect. To sum up, from my point of view, the
existing household finance theories are inadequate to support judgments about
household rationality.

I believe two alternative directions of study to be promising: individual constraint
and intrinsic heterogeneity. The first methodology still lies within the framework of
standard theories, but pays more attention to the constraints that households are
subject to. The second methodology is outside of traditional study setting and is
informed by the fruits of other disciplines, particularly personality psychology. The
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following represent some of the typical research questions that could be answered
using these methodologies. First, how do the factors reflecting constraints affect
household financial behaviour and outcomes? Various factors contribute to the
constraints on households in the utility optimisation problem. Determining how these
factors affect households’ financial behaviour and consequent outcomes will provide
a deeper understanding of both positive household finance and the application of
normative household finance. Second, are there intrinsic heterogeneities responsible
for individual investment behaviour and outcome? If there are, what are they and
how do they take their effects? This series of questions is also very important.
Individual heterogeneities are omitted in standard theories. However, if a
heterogeneous characteristic is intrinsic and greatly influential, its effect on
investment outcome can be so huge that ignorance of it will result in false theoretical
predictions. For example, if a specific investor characteristic is doomed to make
his/her stock investment seriously underperform and, as result, his/her utility from
nonparticipation in the stock market would be bigger than that from participation,
then investing in stock is an irrational rather than a rational choice for him/her.

With the emphasis on individual constraint and intrinsic heterogeneity, I designed a
study on household finance using a unique dataset from China from three
perspectives: stock market participation, stock investment performance and the effect
of a personality trait on investment outcome. In the first two studies, which are
intended to identify the determinants of stock investment involvement and outcome,
I first recommend candidates for determinants by hypothesising the contribution of
observable investor characteristics to optimisation constraints. For example,
according to numerous studies on labour economics, education level and labour
income are used as a proxy of ability, which is negatively correlated with the cost of
information searching. Obviously, information cost is an important constraint in the
portfolio optimisation model. In this context, I include education level and labour
income in the empirical regression and hypothesise that they are positively correlated
with individual stock market participation probability and expected return
performance. The evidence is in favour of the hypotheses. In addition, I recommend
other candidates that reflect the possibility that individuals fail to optimise. These
independent variables are mainly proxies for behavioural biases. In the last study, I
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newly identify a heterogeneity that is intrinsically embedded in human personality as
a determinant of individual investment return performance. That is, trait anxiety is
detrimental to stock investment performance. People who are prone to feel anxious,
nervous, worried or uneasy are more likely to underperform with respect to their
stock investments.

Apart from the above main studies, I also exploit the unique opportunity available
from the informative database to conduct three ‘mini’ studies on the effect of job
satisfaction on stock market participation, the effect of Chinese public employees’
satisfaction on stock market participation and the role of information screening
preferences in stock market investments. The interesting findings are as follows. First,
overall job satisfaction is negatively correlated with stock market participation.
Dissatisfaction with pay and fringe benefit, and satisfaction with hours of work, job
stability and security increase an individual’s willingness to invest in stocks. This
evidence is consistent with standard theory, in that satisfaction status reflects
marginal utility with respect to income, time cost and background risk exposure. The
findings also imply that stock investment activity, which costs time and is expected
to boost income, is analogous to taking a second job from the perspective of
household labour. Second, as a Chinese characteristic, the public sector economy
differs from other economies in several ways. Exploring the difference from the
perspective of employees’ involvement in the stock market, I find that employees of
public sector units are more likely to participate in the stock market, mainly due to
their higher incomes and education levels. In addition, every feature of their job
satisfaction is in favour of stock ownership. Third, information screening preferences
are subject to the same determinants of investment performance. Investors who have
more wealth and information are prone to trust their own opinions when making
trading decisions, show less vulnerability to behavioural biases, and achieve higher
returns. Although information screening preferences have a somewhat independent
effect on investors’ mistakes and investment outcomes, this is mainly a feature of
winners who are usually wealthy, well-educated and reside in financial centres. It is
also interesting that managers in China who have the typical characteristics of
winners tend to listen to grapevine news, which is actually negatively correlated with
return performance. This may result from overconfidence in their ability to access to
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insider information, which is deeply rooted in Chinese culture.

This study has many limitations. Investment return performance is the dependent
variable in almost all of the regressions in studies 2 and 3. However, as this
performance is self-reported, it may not be as trustworthy as that from trading
records. In addition, I have only two periods of data for investment return rates. This
is not enough to guarantee the consistency of the effects over time. The proxy
variable for trait anxiety, PTA, is not as reliable as scores obtained from formal
psychometric tests. Despite the above shortcomings, I have done my best with the
given dataset, which is actually rare. I aim to obtain a higher-quality dataset for
future studies.
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Tables
Table 1-1. Basic characteristics 11
Panel A. Means and gender difference

Total

Female

Male

Female
minus p-statistic
Male

Demographic characteristics
Age

49.271

48.747 49.541

-0.794

0.002

Ethnic Minority

0.032

0.030

0.033

-0.003

0.450

Married

0.920

0.830

0.966

-0.136

0.000

Family Size

2.906

2.833

2.943

-0.111

0.000

High School Dummy

0.347

0.372

0.334

0.039

0.000

Junior College Dummy

0.190

0.178

0.196

-0.018

0.029

University Dummy

0.139

0.100

0.159

-0.059

0.000

Financial Literacy Dummy

0.788

0.799

0.783

0.016

0.063

Salary Income

0.117

0.082

0.134

-0.052

0.000

Full-time employee
Dummy

0.697

0.578

0.758

-0.180

0.000

Public Sector Dummy

0.352

0.267

0.396

-0.129

0.000

Entrepreneur Dummy

0.066

0.045

0.078

-0.033

0.000

Finance Sector Dummy

0.017

0.019

0.016

0.003

0.234

Manager Dummy

0.038

0.016

0.049

-0.033

0.000

Professional Dummy

0.164

0.121

0.187

-0.066

0.000

Clerk Dummy

0.218

0.223

0.216

0.007

0.437

Internet Access Dummy

0.545

0.579

0.528

0.051

0.000

Financial Center Dummy

0.209

0.269

0.178

0.091

0.000

Education

Job

Other

11

See Appendix 3 Panel A and Panel B for detailed description of the variables.
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Panel B. Proportions and ratios

Characteristics of household head

(I)
Population proportion
in sample

Age level
Age<=35
35<age<=45
45<age<=60
Age>60
Gender
Female
Male
Native
Han
Minority
Marital status
Married
Other
Education levels
Below High school
High school
Junior College
University and above
Employment status
Employed
Retired
Other
Job (conditional on employed)
Public Sector Employee
Private business owner
Other
Industry
Finance
Information
Other
Category of cities
Major city
2th-5th city
Sixth city
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(II)
Conditional rate of
participation

11.52%
27.14%
43.44%
17.90%

22.06%
21.57%
20.62%
11.95%

33.94%
66.06%

21.53%
17.70%

96.82%
3.18%

20.45%
10.85%

92.10%
7.90%

20.82%
12.37%

34.42%
34.68%
18.99%
13.91%

13.14%
22.40%
28.40%
31.91%

69.63%
25.78%
4.59%

22.50%
14.72%
14.84%

50.58%
9.54%
39.88%

25.23%
17.54%
20.18%

1.69%
1.80%
96.50%

37.58%
36.63%
21.71%

42.23%
37.46%
20.30%

24.82%
17.90%
14.13%

Table 1-2. Attitudes and preferences 12

Attitudes/ Preferences
Horizon(year)
Horizon<=1
1< Horizon<=3
Horizon>3
Risk tolerance
High
Middle
Zero
To what extent will investment
outcome influence life quality
Huge
Moderate
No at all
To what extend will investment
outcome influence mood
Huge
Moderate
No at all
Degree of optimism on future
Economy (5 as the highest)
1
2
3
4
5
Self-reported propensity to save (5
as the largest)
1
2
3
4
5

12

(I)

(II)

Population
proportion in sample

Conditional rate
of participation

42%
35%
24%

18.71%
23.65%
20.90%

8%
50%
42%

41.59%
30.29%
5.43%

27%
47%
26%

10.34%
23.59%
26.31%

31%
53%
16%

12.93%
26.90%
15.59%

1.19%
7.72%
33.90%
50.38%
6.81%

12.26%
19.67%
19.14%
20.72%
22.67%

1.57%
14.32%
28.66%
42.44%
13.01%

31.91%
32.65%
23.47%
15.60%
12.24%

See Appendix 3 Panel C for detailed description of the variables.
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Table 2. Financial characteristics on household level
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics

Mean

St. dev. Skewness

Kurtosis

25th
percentile

Median

95th
percentile

30,000
0
0
0
300,000
0

200,000
100000
30000
0
1,400,000
1

Family asset
Bank saving
Stock
Fund
bond
Real estate
Amount of real estate not for
self-residence
Family income
Family total Income
Family disposable income

88,758
15,960
5,645
58
457,311
0.165

3,086,621
62,993
36,486
489
974,753
0.448

97
10
26
11
30
5

9,416
158
1,121
127
1,541
50

10,000
0
0
0
120,000
0

34,341
31,009

26,499
24,073

5
5

62
82

18,646
16,953

72

27,810
78,466
25,180
70,955
(To be continued)

(Table 2 Panel A continued)
Mean
Family expenditure
Total Expenditure
Consumption
Defendants
Loan repayment
Social security
Health care
Travelling
Ratios
Consumption to total expenditure
Total expenditure to deposable
income of household

St. dev. Skewness

Kurtosis

25th
percentile

Median

95th
percentile

31,560
20,919
745
743
2795
335
213

84,431
18,739
3,818
5,518
3,476
1,911
2,274

36
5
33
29
3
23
54

2,004
53
1,661
1,397
26
848
4,100

14,498
11,134
0
0
90
0
0

21,808
16,422
0
0
1840
0
0

66,791
47,201
4,000
4,454
9,204
1,574
626

77.60%
93.11%

16%
119%

-1
18

5
468

69%
62%

80%
80%

99%
154%
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Panel B. Proportions and Ratios
(I)
Financial characteristics

(II)

Ratio of amount of the
group to full sample

Stock ownership
ratio of the group

12.68%

6.49%

5.00%

41.55%

1.00%

47.52%

14.57%
85.43%

14.58%
21.10%

14.69%
85.31%

16.12%
20.61%

14.62%

23.64%

24.72%

20.58%

13.04%
85.31%
1.65%

17.51%
20.61%
17.00%

Family income
Poor (income less than half
of the median)
Top 5% richest in term of
income
Top 1% richest in term of
income
Risk-free financial asset ownership
Bank saving≤0
Bank saving>0
Illiquid asset ownership
No house property
House property
House property not for
self-residence
Background risk (Bad health
condition)
Health care expenditure more
than the median
Residential house resource
Renting
Owning
Other
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of key variables in regressions 13
Panel A. Variables for the first time appear in Chapter 4
mean
Variable
Financial characteristics
Total Asset

0.057

Salary Income

sd

Quantiles
p50
p75

Note

min

p25

max

0.327

0.000

0.016

0.035

0.066

30.062

Sum of bank saving, stock, fund,
bond, and real estate value 14

0.117

0.147

0.000

0.000

0.084

0.174

2.144

Individual salary of primary job of
household head

Stockholding

0.161

0.632

0

0

0

0

15

Value amount of equity held in
household’s portfolio

Variables reflecting information
cost
Financial Literacy Dummy

0.788

0.409

0

1

1

1

1

=1 if know GFC was ever
happened in history

Financial Center Dummy

0.209

0.407

0

0

0

0

1

=1 if dwelling in Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou or Shenzhen

Internet Access Dummy

0.545

0.498

0

0

1

1

1

=1 if having computer with access
to internet at home
(To be continued)

13
14

For detailed description for all variables, see Appendix 3. For variables whose names are not self-explaining, brief descriptions are list in the ‘Note’ column.
See Table 2 Panel A ‘Family asset’ for descriptive statistics for each asset holding.
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(Table 3 Panel A continued )
mean

sd

Variable

min

p25

Quantiles
p50
p75

Note
max

Job Satisfaction
Overall

3.342

0.735

1

3

3

4

5

Overall satisfaction level on job in
general

Pay

2.552

0.972

1

2

3

3

5

Specific satisfaction level on
salary income

Fringe Benefits

2.707

0.975

1

2

3

3

5

Specific satisfaction level on
Fringe Benefits

Hours of work

3.105

0.839

1

3

3

4

5

Specific satisfaction level on
Hours of work

Job Stability

3.223

0.884

1

3

3

4

5

Specific satisfaction level on Job
Stability

Job Security

3.415

0.825

1

3

3

4

5

Specific satisfaction level on Job
Security

Relationship with Co-workers

3.678

0.667

1

3

4

4

5

Specific satisfaction level on
Relationship with Co-workers
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Panel B. Variables for the first time appear in Chapter 5
mean

sd

Variable

Quantiles
min
p25

Note
p50

p75

max

Measures for Individual stock investment
performance
HPR 1

-2.705

28.574

-95

-20

-3

10

300

Holding period return
rate in last half year

HPR 2

-13.007 36.017

-95

-40

-20

10

500

Holding period return
rate in last three year

AR 1

2.825

71.125

-99.750

-36.000 -5.910 21.000 1500.000

Annualized return rate
corresponding to HPR 1

AR 2

-6.247

12.804

-63.160

-15.657 -7.168 3.228

81.712

Annualized return rate
corresponding to HPR 2

Loser 1

0.515

0.500

0

0

1

1

1

=1 if HPR 1 <0

Loser 2

0.656

0.475

0

0

1

1

1

=1 if HPR 2 <0
(To be continued)
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(Table 3 Panel B Continued)
mean

sd

Variable

Quantiles Note
min
p25

sd
max

Note

p50

mean
p75

Investor Mistakes
Under-diversification

2.831

2.014

1

2

2

3

40

Number of stocks held in
portfolio

Disposition Effect

-0.860

0.617

-2

-1

-1

0

0

=0 if never cut loss; =-1
if sometimes cut loss;
=-2 if always strictly cut
loss

Information Screening Preferences
Personal Experience Preference
Own Analysis Preference
Consultant Advice Preference
Peer Opinion Preference
Grapevine News Preference

2.805
2.918
2.297
1.549
0.476

1.123
1.070
1.177
1.096
0.930

0
0
0
0
0

2
2
1
1
0

3
3
2
1
0

4
4
3
2
1

4
4
4
4
4
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Panel C. Variables for the first time appear in Chapter 6

mean

sd

Quantiles
min
p25

SA

3.050

0.714

1

2.75

3

3.5

5

FC_Assets

3.550

0.892

1

3

3

4

5

FC_Salary_income

3.395

0.873

1

3

3

4

5

FC_Job_stability

3.213

0.613

1

3

3

3

5

FC_Work_pressure

3.445

0.792

1

3

3

4

5

Stock Price Consideration

2.301

1.202

1

1

2

3

5

PTA

0.002

0.689

-2.476

-0.390

0.000

0.394

2.163

PTA2

0.000

0.680

-2.645

-0.409

0.009

0.399

2.366

Variable

Notes
p50

p75

max

Global Financial Crisis related Variables
State anxiety caused by
GFC
GFC’s impact on
household total asset
GFC’s impact on
individual salary income
GFC’s impact on
individual job stability
GFC’s impact on
individual work pressure
Importance of stock price
for an interviewee’s
evaluation on GFC impacts

Measures for Trait Anxiety
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Proxy for TA derived from
a quantile regression
Proxy for TA derived from
an OLS regression

Table 4-1. Determinants of Stock Market Participation
Panel A. Probit regression for determinants of stock market participation

Independent variables
Constraint
Total Asset
High Vulnerability to Wealth
Risk Dummy
Low Vulnerability to Wealth
Risk Dummy
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Salary Income
Financial Literacy Dummy
Financial Center Dummy
Internet Access Dummy

Dependent variable: Stock-owner Dummy
(=1 if one has or had ever held stocks)
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
dF/dx
Coef.
z
p>z

(V)
x-bar

0.1153
-0.0789

0.4601
-0.3411

3.69
-7.67

0.0000
0.0000

0.0584
0.2640

0.0505

0.1929

4.99

0.0000

0.2550

0.0462
0.0589
0.0453
0.0908
0.0691
0.0874
0.0745

0.1794
0.2205
0.1708
0.3623
0.3012
0.3216
0.3028

4.02
4.1
2.8
2.78
6.54
8.34
8.33

0.0000
0.3465
0.0000
0.1922
0.0050
0.1432
0.0050
0.1202
0.0000
0.7948
0.0000
0.2244
0.0000
0.5629
(To be continued)
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(Table 4-1 Panel A continued)

Independent variables

Dependent variable: Stock-owner Dummy
(=1 if one has or had ever held stocks)
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
dF/dx
Coef.
z
p>z

(V)
x-bar

Behavioral Heterogeneity
High Risk Tolerance Dummy
Low Risk Tolerance Dummy
Gamble Dummy
Optimistic Expectation Dummy
Pessimistic Expectation Dummy
Propensity to Consume

0.1042
-0.2251
0.0284
0.0299
0.0267
0.0152

0.3637
-0.9719
0.1088
0.1141
0.1016
0.0607

6.74
-23.85
2.07
1.76
0.6
2.62

0.0000
0.0000
0.0380
0.0780
0.5490
0.0090

0.0798
0.4163
0.0976
0.0690
0.0103
1.7786

Other Control Variables
Age
Age squared
Female
Married
Ethnic Minority

0.0105
-0.0001
0.0452
0.0623
-0.0711

0.0418
-0.0004
0.1756
0.2805
-0.3337

3.92
-3.63
4.68
3.95
-3.15

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0020

49.22
2565.72
0.3399
0.9215
0.0305

Note: Number of observations is 9027; Pseudo R Square is 0.2056. Some insignificant control variables and the constant term are not reported to
save space.
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Panel B. Robust Check

Independent variables

Dependent variable: Stock-owner Dummy
(=1 if one has or had ever held stocks)
(I)
(II)
(III)

Constraint
Total Asset

0.460***
(3.69)

0.520***
(4.34)

High Vulnerability to Wealth
Risk Dummy

-0.341***

-0.462***

(-7.67)

(-11.16)

0.193***

0.0832**

(4.99)
0.362***
(2.78)
0.179***
(4.02)
0.221***
(4.10)
0.171***
(2.80)
0.301***
(6.54)
0.322***
(8.34)
0.303***
(8.33)

(2.31)
0.516***
(4.15)
0.207***
(4.98)
0.268***
(5.33)
0.263***
(4.57)
0.333***
(7.79)
0.294***
(8.14)
0.368***
(10.80)

Low Vulnerability to Wealth
Risk Dummy
Salary Income
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Financial Literacy Dummy
Financial Center Dummy
Internet Access Dummy
Behavioral Heterogeneity

0.364***
(6.74)
-0.972***
(-23.85)
0.109**
(2.07)

0.349***
(6.75)
-1.021***
(-26.26)
0.113**
(2.23)

Optimistic Expectation
Dummy

0.114*

0.110*

Propensity to Consume

(1.76)
0.0607***
(2.62)

High Risk Tolerance Dummy
Low Risk Tolerance Dummy
Gamble Dummy
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(1.77)
0.0388*
(1.78)
(To be continued)

(Table 4-1 Panel B continued)
Dependent variable: Stock-owner Dummy
(=1 if one has or had ever held stocks)
(I)
(II)
(III)

Independent variables
Other Control Variables

0.0418***
(3.92)
-0.000389***
(-3.63)
0.176***
(4.68)
0.281***
(3.95)
-0.334***
(-3.15)
9027
0.206

Age
Age squared
Female
Married
Ethnic Minority
N
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

0.0300***
(2.98)
-0.000327***
(-3.23)
0.144***
(4.05)
0.268***
(4.04)
-0.304***
(-3.02)
9116
0.108

0.0385***
(3.84)
-0.000371***
(-3.68)
0.246***
(6.90)
0.372***
(5.39)
-0.386***
(-3.80)
9099
0.153

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: Some insignificant control variables and the constant term are not reported to
save space.
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Table 4-2 Job Satisfaction and Stock Market Participation
Panel A. Probit regression for job satisfaction effect

(I)
Independent variable:
Job Satisfaction
Overall
Pay
Fringe Benefits
Hours of work
Job Stability
Job Security
Relationship with Co-workers

Dependent variable: Stock-owner Dummy
(=1 if one has or had ever held stocks)
(II)
(III)
(IV)

dF/dx

Coef.

-0.0326
-0.0160
-0.0054
0.0158
0.0341
0.0166
0.0005

-0.1050
-0.0517
-0.0173
0.0507
0.1096
0.0535
0.0016

z-statistc

-3.39
-2.55
-0.82
2.34
4.55
2.12
0.06

p>z

0.0010
0.0110
0.4090
0.0190
0.0000
0.0340
0.9500

(V)
x-bar

3.3471
2.5636
2.7160
3.1112
3.2376
3.4278
3.6806

Note: All the independent variables in the regression are measures of job satisfaction, as listed in the table. This regression is identical to the one
reported in Panel B column (I), where the magnitude of effects, dF/dx is not reported.
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Panel B. Robust Check
Dependent variable: Stock-owner Dummy
(=1 if one has or had ever held stocks)
(I)
(II)
(III)

Independent variables
Job Satisfaction
Overall
Pay
Fringe Benefits
Hours of work
Job Stability
Job Security
Relationship with Co-workers

-0.105***
(-3.39)
-0.0517**
(-2.55)
-0.0173
(-0.82)
0.0507**
(2.34)
0.110***
(4.55)
0.0535**
(2.12)
0.00163
(0.06)

-0.0985***
(-3.17)
-0.0498**
(-2.45)
-0.0153
(-0.73)
0.0555**
(2.55)
0.104***
(4.29)
0.0517**
(2.04)
-0.0121
(-0.46)

-0.0552*
(-1.65)
-0.0657***
(-2.98)
-0.0390*
(-1.71)
0.0437*
(1.87)
0.0413
(1.58)
0.0403
(1.48)
-0.0178
(-0.63)

-0.00599***
(-3.99)
0.196***
(5.80)
0.396***
(5.77)
-0.347***
(-3.45)

0.00369**
(2.15)
0.283***
(7.60)
0.409***
(5.47)
-0.365***
(-3.37)
0.327***
(5.97)
-1.041***
(-24.42)
0.863***
(7.01)
1.048***
(9.05)
7449
0.139

Control
Age
Female
Married
Ethnic Minority
High Risk Tolerance Dummy
Low Risk Tolerance Dummy
Total Asset
Salary Income
7707
0.00593

N
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

7707
0.0163

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: In Column I, only variables measuring job satisfaction are included as
independent variable; in Column II, personal characteristics are added; Column III
further includes all significant variables identified in Table 4-1 regression.
Insignificant control variables and constant are not reported to save space.
85

Table 5-1. Determinants of Individual Stock Investment Return Performance
(IP)
Panel A. OLS regression for determinants of IP
Dependent variable: IP
(I)
(II)
AR 1
AR 2

Independent variables
Traditional variables
Total Asset
Age
Female
Ethnic Minority
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Risk Tolerance

7.144***
(2.80)
0.101
(0.34)
-5.797
(-1.20)
-3.308
(-0.21)
0.455
(0.06)
1.715
(0.21)
15.69*
(1.78)
7.300*
(1.67)

0.513
(1.18)
0.0327
(0.64)
-0.194
(-0.24)
-5.161**
(-2.04)
1.029
(0.87)
0.367
(0.28)
0.299
(0.20)
-0.482
(-0.67)

0.193
(0.18)
-11.65***
(-3.29)

0.469***
(2.58)
-3.148***
(-5.36)

-1.552
(-0.38)
1.405
(0.49)
0.0849
(0.03)
-1.115
(-0.34)
1298
0.03

0.0374
(0.06)
0.738
(1.55)
0.595
(1.27)
0.748
(1.39)
1346
0.03

Investor mistakes
Under-diversification
Disposition Effect
Job Satisfaction
Overall
Pay
Hours of Work
Job Stability
N
adj. R2
t statistics in parentheses

*

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: The dependent variables AR 1 and AR 2 , both are measures for IP. Some
insignificant control variables and constant term are not reported to save space.
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Panel B. Candidates for instrument variables for sample selection bias analysis

Independent variables

Participation
(I)
Stock-owner

Investment performance
(II)
(III)
AR 1
AR 2

Job Satisfaction
Overall
Pay
Hours of Work
Job Stability

-0.0598*
(-1.93)
-0.0901***
(-4.40)
0.0414*
(1.77)
0.0212
(0.86)

3.015
(0.98)
1.647
(0.81)
-0.242
(-0.11)
0.175
(0.07)

0.370
(0.68)
0.547
(1.53)
0.533
(1.33)
0.365
(0.86)

0.0271**
(2.36)
-0.000239**
(-2.05)
0.190***
(4.94)
0.279***
(3.61)
-0.340***
(-3.12)

0.231
(0.19)
-0.000115
(-0.01)
-6.510*
(-1.68)
3.861
(0.45)
-9.891
(-0.76)

0.155
(0.72)
-0.00161
(-0.73)
-0.372
(-0.54)
-0.265
(-0.18)
-3.377
(-1.58)

0.197***
(4.12)
0.278***
(5.03)
0.247***
(3.97)
0.283***
(6.87)
0.326***
(8.43)
0.284***
(5.86)
0.168
(1.14)
0.385***
(4.77)

2.965
(0.57)
2.876
(0.49)
14.16**
(2.20)
7.275*
(1.85)
4.957
(1.19)
2.678
(0.49)
3.704
(0.31)
1.254
(0.20)

Demographic Characteristics
Age
Age square
Female
Married
Ethnic Minority
Constraints
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Financial Center Dummy
Internet Access Dummy
Financial Literacy Dummy
Salary Income
Household Total Income
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1.714*
(1.85)
1.122
(1.09)
1.275
(1.13)
0.499
(0.72)
-0.731
(-0.99)
-0.168
(-0.17)
0.707
(0.33)
0.721
(0.60)
(To be continued)

(Table 5-1 Panel B continued)
Participation
(I)
Stock-owner
0.444***
(3.39)
0.0196
(0.36)
-0.00888
(-0.19)
0.244**
(2.18)

Independent variables
Total Asset
House-owner Dummy
Mortgage Dummy
Finance Sector Dummy

Investment performance
(II)
(III)
AR 1
AR 2
6.825***
0.502
(2.87)
(1.18)
4.666
0.790
(0.83)
(0.79)
-0.800
1.039
(-0.17)
(1.27)
7.519
3.346**
(0.78)
(1.99)

Preference and belief
0.740***
(24.56)
-3.773*
(-1.67)
0.107**
(1.97)
0.0429*
(1.88)
7451

Risk Tolerance
Cigarette Consumption
Gamble Dummy
Optimism on Economy
N
adj. R2
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

10.81***
(3.13)
-250.2
(-1.08)
2.705
(0.52)
3.582
(1.56)
1712
0.018

0.198
(0.33)
-74.75*
(-1.89)
0.0899
(0.10)
0.402
(0.99)
1772
0.009

0.164
*

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: Dependent variable in model (I) is measure of stock investment participation;
in model (II) / (III) dependent variable is measure for return performance, namely
annualized return rate in half year/ three years period before survey. Independent
variables to the interest are the group about job satisfaction. Some insignificant
control variables and constant term are not reported to save space.
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Panel C. Heckman selection model


AR 1 as measure of IP:

LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):
athrho
lnsigma
rho
sigma
lambda


Coef.
-0.152
4.268
-0.151
71.375
-10.773

chi2(1) =1.66
Std. Err.
0.087
0.020
0.085
1.394
6.160

z
-1.75
218.46

Prob > chi2 = 0.1972
P>z
0.08
0

AR 2 as measure of IP:

LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):
athrho
lnsigma
rho
sigma
lambda

Coef.
0.048
2.545
0.048
12.743
0.615

chi2(1) =0.02
Std. Err.
0.380
0.021
0.379
0.268
4.840

z
0.13
121.1

Prob > chi2 = 0.9015
P>z
0.899
0

Note: For the regression of AR 1 , number of observation in regression is 7315, where
5603 observations are censored; for that of AR 2 , number of observation in regression
is 7375, where 5603 observations are censored. Independent variables for both
participation regression and IP regression are the same variables used in Table 4-1
Panel A. Instrumental variables are measures for job satisfaction level, including job
satisfaction variables such as Overall, Pay, Hours of Work and Job Stability.

89

Table 5-2 Information Screening Preference and Investor characteristics
Panel A. Association investor characteristics to Information Screening Preference (IPS)

Independent variables
Age
Female
Ethnic Minority
Total Asset
Salary Income
House-owner Dummy
University Dummy
Financial Literacy Dummy
Financial Center Dummy

(I)
Personal
Experience
0.00230
(0.75)
-0.107**
(-2.00)
-0.203
(-1.17)
0.175
(0.67)
-0.0253
(-0.16)
-0.123
(-1.57)
-0.0283
(-0.42)
0.108
(1.49)
-0.0893
(-1.61)

Dependent variable: IPS
(II)
(III)
Own
Consultant
Analysis
Advice
-0.00249
-0.000315
(-0.81)
(-0.11)
-0.0173
-0.0194
(-0.32)
(-0.38)
0.0714
-0.232
(0.40)
(-1.37)
0.784***
-0.0110
(2.59)
(-0.32)
0.164
-0.244
(1.00)
(-1.59)
-0.0721
0.000679
(-0.92)
(0.01)
0.0844
-0.0692
(1.25)
(-1.06)
0.212***
-0.0544
(2.95)
(-0.77)
0.125**
0.000711
(2.23)
(0.01)
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(IV)
Peer
Opinion
0.00380
(1.25)
0.112**
(2.13)
0.212
(1.23)
0.0306
(0.91)
0.116
(0.74)
-0.0356
(-0.47)
0.125*
(1.88)
-0.0571
(-0.79)
-0.00125
(-0.02)

(V)
Grapevine
News
-0.00884**
(-2.42)
0.0900
(1.42)
0.387**
(2.02)
0.0238
(0.70)
-0.119
(-0.64)
0.262***
(2.67)
-0.0592
(-0.73)
-0.207**
(-2.47)
-0.107*
(-1.66)
(To be continued)

(Table 5-2 Panel A continued)

Independent variables
Internet Access Dummy
Retired Dummy
Finance Sector Dummy
Manager Dummy
N
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

(I)
Personal
Experience
0.0225
(0.39)
0.0215
(0.25)
0.0460
(0.33)
-0.0963
(-0.83)
2001
0.000643

Dependent variable: IPS
(II)
(III)
Own
Consultant
Analysis
Advice
0.0850
-0.0480
(1.51)
(-0.87)
0.107
-0.0602
(1.24)
(-0.72)
0.334**
-0.145
(2.36)
(-1.10)
-0.244**
0.0466
(-2.13)
(0.41)
2044
2020
0.00878
0.000667

(IV)
Peer
Opinion
-0.0436
(-0.78)
-0.132
(-1.55)
-0.0279
(-0.21)
-0.0315
(-0.27)
1994
0.00102

(V)
Grapevine
News
-0.127*
(-1.91)
0.143
(1.39)
-0.137
(-0.81)
0.407***
(3.06)
1987
0.0131

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: Dependent variables in model (I) to (V) are respectively preference on Personal Experience, Own Analysis, Consultant Advice, Peer
Opinion and Grapevine News. Some insignificant control variables such as job satisfaction measures and constant term are not reported to save
space.
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Panel B. Association investor characteristics to confidence

Independent variables
Financial Literacy Dummy
Total Asset
Financial Center Dummy
Manager Dummy
Finance Sector Dummy
N
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

Dependent variable
Confidence
0.279***
(3.16)
0.853**
(2.35)
0.125*
(1.84)
-0.439***
(-3.14)
0.572***
(2.88)
1925
0.0180

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: Dependent variable is the dummy variable Confidence, which takes value of 1
when the investor values his or her own opinion more important than others’ 15, and 0
otherwise. Insignificant control variables such as job satisfaction measures and
constant term are not reported to save space.

15

An investor is recognized as valuing his or her own opinion more important than others’ when s/he gave either
Personal Experience or Own Analysis the highest score among all the 5 IPSs, and the value of dummy variable
Confidence is correspondingly valued as one.
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Table 5-3 Information Screening Preference and Investor Mistakes
Panel A. Association Information Screening Preference to Investor Mistakes
Table 5-3 Panel A reports the correlation matrix for information screening preferences and investor mistakes.
Coefficients of
correlation
Under-diversification
Disposition Effect

Personal Experience

Own Analysis

Consultant Advice

Peer Opinion

Grapevine News

-0.039
(0.104)
-0.055
(0.013)

0.001
(0.976)
-0.060
(0.006)

0.003
(0.915)
0.011
(0.607)

0.018
(0.460)
0.101
(0.000)

-0.039
(0.256)
-0.055
(0.731)

p statistics in parentheses

Panel B. Association investor confidences to Investor Mistakes
Table 5-3 Panel B reports subsample mean, group difference and t-test result of the group difference for propensities related with investor
mistakes.

Under-diversification
Disposition Effect

Conditional mean
Confidence=1
Confidence=0
-2.911
-2.735
-0.877
-0.805
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Group Difference
of mean
-0.176
-0.072

p-statistic of the
group difference
0.112
0.019

Table 5-4 Information Screening Preference (IPSs) and of Individual Stock Investment Return Performance (IP)
Panel A. Effects of specific ISPs on IP
Independent variable
Personal Experience
Preference

(I)

Dependent variable: AR 1
(II)
(III)

(IV)

Dependent variable: AR 2
(V)
(VI)

3.049

1.385

0.0646

-0.0953

(1.52)

(0.70)

(0.19)

(-0.26)

Own Analysis
Preference

5.051**

1.612

0.299

0.134

Peer Opinion Preference

(2.56)
-1.929
(-0.99)

(0.83)
-2.223
(-1.15)

(0.87)
-0.756**
(-2.24)

(0.38)
-0.703**
(-2.02)

Grapevine News
Preference

-0.887

-1.005

-0.405

-0.327

(-0.44)
5.104
(1.48)
199.8***
(10.99)
0.0359
(0.19)
-5.943
(-1.57)
-9.915
(-0.72)

(-1.02)

(-0.39)
Risk Tolerance
Total Asset
Age
Female
Ethnic Minority

8.185**
(2.46)
6.996***
(3.00)
0.129
(0.72)
-5.239
(-1.44)
-13.45
(-0.99)

-0.644
(-1.09)
0.624
(1.48)
0.00630
(0.19)
-0.477
(-0.73)
-5.567**
(-2.37)
94

(-0.79)
-0.923
(-1.49)
10.23***
(2.92)
0.00639
(0.19)
-0.442
(-0.64)
-5.188**
(-2.15)
(To be continued)

(Table 5-4 Panel A continued)
Independent variable
PTA

(I)

Family Size
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Financial Center Dummy
Public Sector Dummy
Finance Sector Dummy
Manager Dummy
Under-diversification
Disposition Effect
1679
0.007

N
adj. R2
t statistics in parentheses

*

Dependent variable: AR 1
(II)
(III)
-9.635***
-10.35***
(-3.93)
(-4.07)
-2.934
-3.165
(-1.33)
(-1.39)
3.781
-0.288
(0.77)
(-0.06)
5.008
-0.909
(0.89)
(-0.16)
14.35**
5.077
(2.31)
(0.78)
**
9.370
-1.960
(2.58)
(-0.51)
-2.911
-0.253
(-0.77)
(-0.06)
8.032
4.716
(0.86)
(0.50)
8.167
-1.973
(0.96)
(-0.22)
-0.989
0.293
(-1.19)
(0.35)
-12.79***
-10.10***
(-4.46)
(-3.40)
1725
1567
0.036
0.100

(IV)

1742
0.004

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Dependent variable: AR 2
(V)
(VI)
-1.553***
-1.735***
(-3.54)
(-3.73)
-0.217
-0.127
(-0.55)
(-0.30)
1.827**
1.300
(2.08)
(1.42)
1.407
0.956
(1.41)
(0.91)
1.526
0.597
(1.38)
(0.51)
0.701
-0.0592
(1.08)
(-0.08)
*
-1.198
-1.057
(-1.77)
(-1.48)
*
3.243
3.143*
(1.94)
(1.83)
**
3.308
3.151*
(2.18)
(1.92)
-0.576***
-0.532***
(-3.82)
(-3.39)
-2.942***
-2.473***
(-5.76)
(-4.57)
1774
1613
0.037
0.039

Note: Independent variables in Column (I) and (IV) are IPSs only; in Column (II) and (V) are only determinants identified in previous section;
Column (III) and (VI) combine both. Some insignificant control variables and the constant term are not reported to save space.
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Panel B. Effect of confidence on IP

Independent variable
Confidence
Risk Tolerance
Total Asset
Age
Female
Ethnic Minority
PTA
Family Size
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy

Dependent variable: AR 1
(I)
(II)
***
12.98
(3.29)
8.185**
(2.46)
6.996***
(3.00)
0.129
(0.72)
-5.239
(-1.44)
-13.45
(-0.99)
-9.635***
(-3.93)
-2.934
(-1.33)
3.781
(0.77)
5.008
(0.89)
14.35**
(2.31)

(III)
7.437*
(1.89)
5.115
(1.49)
200.4***
(11.05)
0.0365
(0.20)
-6.359*
(-1.69)
-11.36
(-0.83)
-10.32***
(-4.07)
-3.238
(-1.43)
0.0796
(0.02)
-0.689
(-0.12)
4.723
(0.73)
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(IV)
1.290*
(1.88)

Dependent variable: AR 2
(V)

-0.644
(-1.09)
0.624
(1.48)
0.00630
(0.19)
-0.477
(-0.73)
-5.567**
(-2.37)
-1.553***
(-3.54)
-0.217
(-0.55)
1.827**
(2.08)
1.407
(1.41)
1.526
(1.38)

(VI)
0.961
(1.34)
-0.929
(-1.50)
10.29***
(2.94)
0.00701
(0.20)
-0.499
(-0.72)
-5.486**
(-2.28)
-1.719***
(-3.70)
-0.156
(-0.37)
1.325
(1.45)
0.977
(0.93)
0.511
(0.43)
(To be continued)

(Table 5-4 Panel B continued)
Independent variable
Financial Center Dummy
Public Sector Dummy
Finance Sector Dummy
Manager Dummy
Under-diversification
Disposition Effect
N
adj. R2
t statistics in parentheses

*

Dependent variable: AR 1
(I)
(II)
(III)
9.370**
-2.155
(2.58)
(-0.56)
-2.911
-0.0978
(-0.77)
(-0.02)
8.032
4.364
(0.86)
(0.47)
8.167
-2.438
(0.96)
(-0.27)
-0.989
0.288
(-1.19)
(0.34)
-12.79***
-10.45***
(-4.46)
(-3.54)
1679
1725
1567
0.006
0.036
0.101

Dependent variable: AR 2
(IV)
(V)
(VI)
0.701
-0.0455
(1.08)
(-0.06)
-1.198*
-1.024
(-1.77)
(-1.44)
3.243*
3.131*
(1.94)
(1.82)
3.308**
3.036*
(2.18)
(1.85)
-0.576***
-0.533***
(-3.82)
(-3.39)
***
-2.942
-2.556***
(-5.76)
(-4.75)
1742
1774
1613
0.001
0.037
0.038

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: Independent variables in Column (I) and (IV) are IPSs only; in Column (II) and (V) are only determinants identified in previous section;
Column (III) and (VI) combine both. Some insignificant control variables and the constant term are not reported to save space.
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Table 6-1. Regression for deriving PTA

Independent variable
FC_Assets
FC_Salary_income
FC_Job_stability
FC_Work_pressure
Age
Age Squared
Debtor Dummy
Financial Literacy Dummy
Knowledge on GFC
Financial Center Dummy
2nd Class City Dummy
3rd Class City Dummy
4th Class City Dummy
5th Class City Dummy
6th Class City Dummy
Public sector Dummy
Second industry Dummy
Third industry Dummy
Policy Consideration
Stock Price Consideration
PCI Consideration

Dependent variable: SA
(I)
(II)
Quantile Regression
OLS Regression
0.0373***
0.0646***
(6.36)
(6.41)
***
0.0267
0.0443***
(4.26)
(4.11)
***
0.0446
0.0455***
(5.82)
(3.46)
***
0.0297
0.0440***
(5.39)
(4.65)
0.00832***
0.0147***
(3.28)
(3.36)
-0.0000798***
-0.000143***
(-3.20)
(-3.34)
-0.0204
-0.0455**
(-1.56)
(-2.02)
-0.00548
-0.0433**
(-0.52)
(-2.40)
0.0328***
0.0517***
(6.42)
(5.89)
-0.0733***
-0.0992***
(-4.80)
(-3.77)
***
-0.0708
-0.117***
(-5.40)
(-5.18)
***
-0.0697
-0.115***
(-3.64)
(-3.49)
*
-0.0424
-0.0283
(-1.79)
(-0.69)
-0.00945
-0.0123
(-0.41)
(-0.31)
-0.0418***
-0.0592**
(-2.94)
(-2.42)
-0.0374***
-0.0533**
(-2.79)
(-2.31)
0.120**
0.210**
(2.15)
(2.17)
0.126**
0.215**
(2.28)
(2.25)
0.00811*
0.0204**
(1.72)
(2.50)
0.00856**
0.0128*
(1.97)
(1.70)
**
0.0112
0.0231***
(2.30)
(2.75)
(To be continued)
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(Table 6-1 Continued)

Independent variable
IR Consideration
Export Consideration
GDP Consideration
Employment Consideration
Bankruptcy Consideration
N
adj. R2
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

Dependent variable: SA
(I)
(II)
Quantile Regression
OLS Regression
0.0128**
0.0247***
(2.49)
(2.79)
*
-0.00899
-0.00900
(-1.70)
(-0.99)
0.0106*
0.0200*
(1.75)
(1.91)
0.0159***
0.0320***
(2.83)
(3.31)
0.0246***
0.0556***
(6.27)
(8.22)
9218
9218
0.093
0.0075

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: Dependent variable SA is a measure for state anxiety caused by GFC.
Independent variables are external inducements of SA. Specification (I) uses
Quantile Regression in median and Specification (II) employs OLS Regression.
Some insignificant control variables and the constant term are not reported to save
space.
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Table 6-2. External validity check on PTA
Psychological Factors
(I)
Mood facet of

Dependent variables
(II)
Psychological Well-being***

Excepted Sign
(III)
Negative

Coefficient
(IV)
-0.0989

t- Statistic
(V)
-9.01

Consistency
(VI)
Yes

Neuroticism

Emotional Fluctuation ***

Positive

0.0774

7.62

Yes

Own Analysis **

Negative

-0.0923

-2.72

Yes

Consultant Advice **

Positive

0.0800

2.13

Yes

Grapevine News *

Positive

0.0569

1.92

Yes

Satisfaction on Life***

Negative

-0.2120

-8.15

Yes

Overall***

Negative

-0.0574

-4.79

Yes

Pay***

Negative

-0.0591

-3.73

Yes

Depression facet of

Hours of Working**

Negative

-0.0408

-2.98

Yes

Neuroticism

Relationship with Co-worker*

Negative

-0.0234

-2.14

Yes

Fringe Benefit**

Negative

-0.0434

-2.74

Yes

Job Stability***

Negative

-0.0729

-5.12

Yes

Security***

Negative

-0.0444

-3.30

Yes

Optimism on Economy ***

Negative

-0.0805

-6.88

Yes

Optimism on Society ***

Negative

-0.0444

-3.91

Yes

Vulnerability facet of
Neuroticism

Optimism
*

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Note: Table 6-2 reports summary data from 15 regressions. In every regression, independent variable to the interest is PTA. The fifteen
dependent variables (described in Appendix 4) are listed in column (II), which reflect or are associated with corresponding psychological factors
listed in Column (I). The signs of PTA’s effects on each column (II) variables predicted by Psychology theory are shown in Column (III). And
the main results of each regression, i.e. the coefficients and t-statistics values of PTA are listed in Column (IV) and (V) respectively. Finally,
blanks in Column (VI) are filled with ‘Yes’ if the sign of estimated PTA coefficients in Column (IV) is consistent with the sign predicted in
Column (III), and ‘No’ if otherwise. In these regressions I have controlled basic demographic and financial characteristics such as Age, Marital
Status, Education Level, Total Asset and Salary Income. For Optimism/Pessimism, more variables are additional controlled, which actually does
not bring material difference to the results.
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Table 6-3. Endogeneity Check on PTA
Dependent variable
PTA
0.0211
(1.21)
0.0102**
(2.45)
-0.000116***
(-2.89)
0.0149
(0.98)
0.0145
(0.35)
-0.214**
(-2.04)
9218
0.002

Independent variables
Stock-owner Dummy
Age
Age Squared
Female
Ethnic Minority
_cons
N
adj. R2
t statistics in parentheses

*

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6-4. Distinguish trait anxiety from risk aversion

Independent variable
PTA
Age
Age Squared
Female
Married
Family Size
Total Asset
Salary Income
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Internet Access Dummy
N
adj. R2
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

Dependent variable
(I)
(II)
(III)
Risk Aversion Risk Aversion PTA
0.00461
0.00990
(0.26)
(0.55)
0.00928
0.00982**
(1.24)
(2.27)
0.00000674
-0.000115***
(0.09)
(-2.74)
0.0383
0.0112
(1.38)
(0.69)
-0.0128
-0.00860
(-0.26)
(-0.30)
-0.0331**
0.0126
(-2.21)
(1.44)
-0.0421
0.00252
(-1.19)
(0.12)
-0.377***
-0.0586
(-3.87)
(-1.01)
-0.127***
0.0118
(-4.03)
(0.65)
-0.164***
0.0281
(-4.26)
(1.25)
***
-0.278
-0.0294
(-6.29)
(-1.13)
***
-0.231
0.00302
(-8.70)
(0.19)
8907
8907
9218
0.002
0.000
0.0290
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: In column I and (II), dependent variables are both Risk Aversion and
independent variables to the interest are both PTA, which is not controlled in model
(II) but controlled with traditional variables measuring demographic characteristics,
wealth and knowledge. Column (III) reports a regression of PTA on a host of
variables same as the control variables in model (II).
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Table 6-5. Effect of trait anxiety on individual stock investment return
performance
Panel A. Trait Anxiety measured by PTA

Independent variable
PTA
Age
Female
Married
Ethnic Minority
Retired Dummy
Family Size
Stock Portfolio Size
Total Asset
Household Total Income
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Financial Center Dummy
Salary Income
Finance Sector Dummy
Risk Tolerance
Gamble Dummy
N
adj. R2
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

Dependent variable: Measure for IP
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
AR 1
AR 2
Loser 1
Loser 2
-9.899***
-1.364***
0.119***
0.121***
(-4.30)
(-3.27)
(2.81)
(2.85)
0.0191
0.0131
-0.0065*
-0.0053
(0.09)
(0.35)
(-1.70)
(-1.37)
-6.260*
-0.587
0.112*
0.0717
(-1.73)
(-0.89)
(1.69)
(1.07)
7.058
0.152
-0.106
0.0461
(0.93)
(0.11)
(-0.77)
(0.33)
*
-11.54
-3.437
0.107
0.154
(-0.95)
(-1.66)
(0.48)
(0.71)
3.281
-0.289
-0.0584
0.152
(0.57)
(-0.27)
(-0.56)
(1.41)
-2.512
-0.067
-0.000
0.022
(-1.16)
(-0.17)
(-0.01)
(0.55)
6.430***
0.651**
-0.069***
-0.048*
(4.62)
(2.54)
(-2.66)
(-1.79)
6.421***
0.510
-0.089
-0.278
(2.80)
(1.20)
(-0.54)
(-0.80)
-1.522
0.564
-0.091
-0.197*
(-0.26)
(0.49)
(-0.82)
(-1.69)
2.780
1.917**
-0.116
-0.190**
(0.59)
(2.26)
(-1.36)
(-2.19)
4.353
1.285
-0.0601
0.0225
(0.83)
(1.36)
(-0.62)
(0.23)
11.15*
1.402
-0.067
-0.163
(1.92)
(1.34)
(-0.63)
(-1.52)
**
5.721
0.285
-0.148
0.029
(1.60)
(0.44)
(-2.25)
(0.44)
4.320
0.845
-0.102
0.177
(0.37)
(0.39)
(-0.48)
(0.81)
5.204
3.111*
-0.065
-0.179
(0.57)
(1.88)
(-0.39)
(-1.08)
8.703***
-0.413
-0.156***
0.007
(2.78)
(-0.74)
(-2.72)
(0.12)
4.359
0.181
-0.034
0.019
(0.89)
(0.20)
(-0.38)
(0.21)
1884
1954
1884
1954
0.036
0.010
0.0214
0.0157
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel B. Trait Anxiety measured by PTA-group Dummies
Dependent variable: Measure for IP
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
AR 1
AR 2
Loser 1
Loser 2

Independent variable

HTA
LTA
Age
Female
Married
Ethnic Minority
Retired Dummy
Family Size
Stock Portfolio Size
Total Asset
Household Total Income
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Financial Center Dummy
Salary Income
Finance Sector Dummy
Risk Tolerance
Gamble Dummy
N
adj. R2
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

p < 0.1,

-9.224**
(-2.17)
10.76**
(2.39)
0.0301
(0.14)
-6.400*
(-1.76)
7.269
(0.96)
-11.64
(-0.96)
2.974
(0.52)
-2.427
(-1.12)
6.344***
(4.55)
6.451***
(2.80)
-2.165
(-0.36)
2.174
(0.46)
3.898
(0.74)
10.95*
(1.88)
5.812
(1.62)
4.783
(0.41)
5.597
(0.61)
8.613***
(2.74)
4.560
(0.93)
1884
0.033
**

p < 0.05,

-1.532**
(-2.00)
2.913***
(3.59)
0.0156
(0.41)
-0.565
(-0.86)
0.257
(0.19)
-3.540*
(-1.71)
-0.423
(-0.40)
-0.0660
(-0.17)
0.653**
(2.56)
0.524
(1.24)
0.393
(0.34)
1.784**
(2.11)
1.254
(1.33)
1.267
(1.21)
0.359
(0.56)
0.877
(0.41)
3.069*
(1.85)
-0.465
(-0.83)
0.177
(0.20)
1954
0.015
***
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p < 0.01

0.0977
(1.25)
-0.140*
(-1.70)
-0.00666*
(-1.73)
0.114*
(1.71)
-0.110
(-0.79)
0.108
(0.49)
-0.0548
(-0.52)
-0.00137
(-0.03)
-0.0674***
(-2.59)
-0.0944
(-0.50)
-0.0826
(-0.75)
-0.109
(-1.27)
-0.0545
(-0.57)
-0.0641
(-0.60)
-0.149**
(-2.26)
-0.108
(-0.50)
-0.0693
(-0.41)
-0.155***
(-2.70)
-0.0366
(-0.41)
1884

0.0754
(0.95)
-0.278***
(-3.41)
-0.00546
(-1.41)
0.0714
(1.06)
0.0378
(0.27)
0.165
(0.76)
0.160
(1.49)
0.0213
(0.52)
-0.0469*
(-1.76)
-0.308
(-0.88)
-0.181
(-1.55)
-0.180**
(-2.07)
0.0254
(0.26)
-0.151
(-1.40)
0.0226
(0.34)
0.172
(0.79)
-0.174
(-1.04)
0.0104
(0.18)
0.0173
(0.19)
1954

0.0204

0.0182

Table 6-6. Robust Check
Panel A. Regressions with Subsample
Dependent variable: Measure for IP
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
AR 1
AR 2
Loser 1
Loser 2

Independent variable

PTA
Age
Female
Married
Ethnic Minority
Retired Dummy
Family Size
Stock Portfolio Size
Total Asset
Household Total Income
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Financial Center Dummy
Salary Income
Finance Sector Dummy
Risk Tolerance
Gamble Dummy
N
adj. R2
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

*

-6.037**
(-2.42)
-0.0813
(-0.38)
-5.785
(-1.53)
6.200
(0.78)
-23.80*
(-1.90)
3.294
(0.58)
-2.304
(-1.02)
4.471***
(2.59)
3.609*
(1.86)
7.733
(1.15)
2.107
(0.45)
3.878
(0.72)
3.282
(0.54)
3.868
(1.05)
-3.764
(-0.31)
10.16
(0.99)
7.530**
(2.25)
6.724
(1.31)
1243
0.021

-1.522***
(-2.91)
0.0207
(0.46)
-1.560**
(-1.97)
-0.810
(-0.48)
-1.940
(-0.79)
-1.292
(-1.06)
-0.681
(-1.43)
1.211***
(3.32)
0.363
(0.87)
2.072
(1.31)
1.614
(1.63)
1.292
(1.14)
0.613
(0.48)
0.568
(0.74)
-2.486
(-0.94)
2.695
(1.26)
-0.494
(-0.71)
0.697
(0.64)
1307
0.016

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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0.129**
(2.36)
-0.00576
(-1.22)
0.101
(1.22)
-0.146
(-0.84)
0.427
(1.52)
-0.0170
(-0.14)
0.0198
(0.40)
-0.0603
(-1.63)
-0.0570
(-0.71)
-0.248
(-1.58)
-0.172*
(-1.67)
-0.133
(-1.13)
-0.0366
(-0.28)
-0.203**
(-2.52)
0.171
(0.63)
-0.259
(-1.15)
-0.129*
(-1.76)
-0.0374
(-0.33)
1243

0.139**
(2.56)
-0.00702
(-1.50)
0.136*
(1.65)
0.0845
(0.48)
0.0188
(0.07)
0.232*
(1.84)
0.0554
(1.11)
-0.0890**
(-2.35)
-0.0777
(-0.82)
-0.305*
(-1.86)
-0.181*
(-1.75)
-0.00749
(-0.06)
-0.146
(-1.11)
0.0181
(0.23)
0.478*
(1.71)
0.000748
(0.00)
-0.0193
(-0.27)
-0.0305
(-0.27)
1307

0.0250

0.0198

Panel B. Regressions with Trait Anxiety Proxy Generated from OLS Model

(I)
AR 1

Independent variable
PTA2
Age
Female
Married
Ethnic Minority
Retired Dummy
Family Size
Stock Portfolio Size
Total Asset
Household Total Income
High School Dummy
Junior College Dummy
University Dummy
Financial Center Dummy
Salary Income
Finance Sector Dummy
Risk Tolerance
Gamble Dummy
N
adj. R2
Pseudo R Square
t statistics in parentheses

Dependent variable
(II)
(III)
AR 2
Loser 1

*

-8.468***
(-3.63)
0.0173
(0.08)
-6.364*
(-1.76)
7.015
(0.92)
-11.36
(-0.93)
3.987
(0.69)
-2.548
(-1.17)
6.373***
(4.57)
6.456***
(2.81)
-1.399
(-0.23)
2.783
(0.59)
4.342
(0.83)
11.46**
(1.98)
5.590
(1.56)
4.864
(0.42)
5.518
(0.60)
8.743***
(2.79)
4.423
(0.90)
1884
0.034

-1.205***
(-2.86)
0.0129
(0.34)
-0.600
(-0.91)
0.161
(0.12)
-3.412*
(-1.65)
-0.188
(-0.18)
-0.0711
(-0.18)
0.644**
(2.51)
0.514
(1.21)
0.583
(0.50)
1.915**
(2.26)
1.287
(1.36)
1.442
(1.37)
0.273
(0.42)
0.916
(0.42)
3.161*
(1.90)
-0.408
(-0.73)
0.190
(0.21)
1954
0.009

p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(IV)
Loser 2

0.102**
(2.38)
-0.00651*
(-1.70)
0.113*
(1.71)
-0.106
(-0.76)
0.105
(0.47)
-0.0669
(-0.64)
0.000172
(0.00)
-0.0682***
(-2.63)
-0.0895
(-0.54)
-0.0925
(-0.84)
-0.116
(-1.36)
-0.0598
(-0.62)
-0.0702
(-0.66)
-0.146**
(-2.23)
-0.109
(-0.51)
-0.0688
(-0.41)
-0.157***
(-2.73)
-0.0347
(-0.39)
1884

0.110**
(2.55)
-0.00526
(-1.36)
0.0729
(1.08)
0.0448
(0.32)
0.151
(0.70)
0.143
(1.33)
0.0227
(0.56)
-0.0470*
(-1.77)
-0.280
(-0.80)
-0.198*
(-1.70)
-0.190**
(-2.19)
0.0220
(0.22)
-0.166
(-1.55)
0.0306
(0.46)
0.170
(0.78)
-0.184
(-1.11)
0.00657
(0.11)
0.0184
(0.20)
1954

0.0205

0.0151

Figures
Figure 1. Model of prospect theory

Note: According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the value function is ‘(i) defined
on deviation from the reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and commonly
convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains.’ In Figure 1, a value function
which satisfies these properties is displayed.
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Figure 2. Stock Market Index in China during the Global Financial Crisis
Panel A. SSE Composite A Share (SHA: 000001)

Panel B. SHE Composite A Share (SHE: 399106)
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Figure 3. Paper Return Rate of Stock Investment in the Period I (from April to
September 2009)
Panel A. Holding Period Return in Sample Period I

Panel B. Annualized Return in Sample Period I
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Figure 4. Paper Return Rate of Stock Investment in the Period II (from October
2006 to September 2009)
Panel A. Holding Period Return in Sample Period II

Panel B. Annualized Return in Sample Period II
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Figure 5. Outline of Sarason’s Model
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Figure 6. A Simplified Version of State-Trait Model of Anxiety

External
Stressors

STATE ANXIETY
-Subjective feelings of
apprehension
-Arousal for the autonomic
nervous system

Processing
activities

TRAIT ANXIETY
-Individual differences in anxiety proneness
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PERFORMANCE

Figure 7. State anxiety caused by GFC (SA)
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Figure 8. Measures of trait anxiety
Panel A. Distribution of PTA

Panel B. Distribution of PTA2
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Appendix 1. List of acronyms
Acronym

Full variable name or meaning

GFC

Global financial crisis beginning at 2008

TA

Trait anxiety

IP

Individual stock investment return performance

SA

State anxiety specific on GFC

PTA

A proxy for TA derived from a quantile model

PTA2

A proxy for TA derived from an OLS model

HTA

High Trait Anxiety

MTA

Middle Trait Anxiety

CUHS

China Urban Household Survey

CFS

China Household Finance Service Demand Survey
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Appendix 2. Questionnaire
Here lists questions from China Household Finance Service Demand Survey (CFS),
which are resource of corresponding variables in empirical regressions.

1.

How important are the following factors when you make your investment
decision? (5=very important；4=important；3=neutral；2=not important；1=not
very important )
Factors
real estates shares mutual funds
insurance bond
Personal experience
Consultant advice
Own analysis
Peer opinion
Grapevine news

2. What are your views on investment risk? ______
(1) I do not mind high risk as long as there is high return; (2) I do not like high risk in
investment; (3) I only make risk-free investment
3.

Do you execute the ‘ cut-loss’ strategy when trading shares, i.e. sell the share
when its price dropped under certain level and the market prospects on this share
is not good?
(1) Execute it strictly _____; (2) Execute it occasionally _____; (3) Never do that
_____
4.

What is the return on your investment in stock market in the past 3 years:
gain____ % or lose ____ %

5.

What is the return on your investment in stock market in the past six months:
gain ____ % or lose ____ %

6.

How do investment results affect your mood____ (1) a lot (2) a little (3) no
impact

7.

How do investment results affect your daily life____ (1) a lot (2) a little (3) no
impact

8.

How do you rate the importance of the following factors when you assess the
impacts of the recent global financial crisis?
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1=not important at all,…, 5=very
important
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

1. The government stimulus package
2. Stock price
3. Consumer price indexes
4. Bank interest rate
5. Decline in export
6. GDP growth rate
7. Employment rate
8. Company closing down/bankrupt
9. Lay off workers

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

9.

How do you agree/disagree with the following statements on financial crisis?
1=strongly disagree ,…, 5=strongly
agree
1. You feel uneasy about it.
1
2
3
4
5
2. You feel nervous about it.
1
2
3
4
5
3. You worry about it.
1
2
3
4
5
4. You fear about it.
1
2
3
4
5
5. You know nothing about its underlying
1
2
3
4
5
causes.
6. You know a little about its impacts.
1
2
3
4
5
7. You feel optimistic about the future
1
2
3
4
5
economy.
8. You feel positive about future social
1
2
3
4
5
development.

10. Has the global financial crisis made any changes to the following aspects of your
life?
1=decreased a lot; 2=somewhat decreased; 3=no change; 4=somewhat increased;
5=increased a lot;
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1. your assets
2. your real income
3. your job security
4. work pressure experienced
5. your health
6. your emotional stability
11. To what extent do you feel satisfied with your life?
1=very unsatisfied; …5=neutral; … 10= very satisfied;
12. To what extent do you feel satisfied with your work?
1=very unsatisfied; …2=neutral; … 5= very satisfied;
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2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5

（1）Pay; (2) Hours of work; (3) Interpersonal Relationship with coworker; (4)
Interpersonal Relationship with superior and subordinate; (5) Work environment;
(6) Fringe benefit; (7) Job stability; (8) Job security; (9) Job overall
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Appendix 3. Description of Variables
Here lists variables that are involved in empirical regressions with their name, description, type (with brief description on value range, if
necessary), as well as resource or calculation method for evaluation.
Panel A: Key social-economic characteristics
I. Basic Demographic characteristics

Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource/ Evaluation

Age

Age of respondent at September 2009

Discrete

CUHS

Age Squared

Age squared

Discrete

Squared value of age

Female

An indicator for gender

Dummy

0=Male, 1 for female

Ethnic Minority

An indicator for ethnic minority

Dummy

0=Han nationality, 1 for otherwise

Married

Marital status of the respondent.

Dummy

1=the respondent is Married, and 0 otherwise

Family Size

Family size

Discrete

Number of family members in the household

Retired Dummy

Retirement status of respondent

Dummy

1=the respondent is Retired Dummy, 0 otherwise

II. Education and financial knowledge
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Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource/ Evaluation

Education Years

Years of schooling attained

Discrete variable
with 8 unique values

CUHS

High School Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent’s highest education
attainment is high school or equivalent

Dummy

1= high school education level, 0 for
otherwise

Junior College Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent’s highest education
attainment is Junior College or equivalent

Dummy

1= junior college education level, 0 for
otherwise

University Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent’s highest education
attainment is University or above

Dummy

1= university or above education level,
0 for otherwise

An indicator for whether the respondent know that
Financial Crisis was ever happened in history

Dummy

1=the respondent do know the basic
knowledge, zero otherwise

Financial Literacy Dummy

III. Financial status

Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource/ Evaluation

Stock Portfolio Size

The value of the respondent’s stock holding at time of the survey

Continuous

CFS

Total Asset

Sum of holding value of bank saving, stock, bond insurance and real
estate at time of the survey

Continuous

CFS

Salary Income

Personal annual labor income in 100,000 RMB Yuan in 2008.

Continuous

CUHS

Household Total Income

Family annual total income in 100,000 RMB Yuan in 2008.

Continuous

CUHS

Stock-owner Dummy

An indicator for whether an household own public equity

Dummy

1=stockowner, 0 for otherwise
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House-owner Dummy

An indicator for whether a household own real estate

Dummy

1=house owner, 0 for otherwise

Mortgage Dummy

An indicator for whether a household have mortgage loan

Dummy

1=mortgage debtor, 0 for otherwise

Debtor Dummy

An indicator for whether a household have debt other than mortgage

Dummy

1= debtor, 0 for otherwise

IV. Other important control variables revealing information cost

Variable Name

Description

Type

Finance Sector Dummy

A indicator whether an respondent work in Finance sector

Dummy

Financial Center Dummy

An indicator whether a respondent lives near a financial
center.
An indicator whether a respondent have internet access at
home at time of the survey
An indicator whether respondent’s life quality is highly
vulnerable to his/her investment outcome
An indicator whether respondent’s life quality is moderately
vulnerable to his/her investment outcome
An indicator whether respondent’s life quality is not
vulnerable to his/her investment outcome

Dummy

Internet Access Dummy
High Vulnerability to Wealth Risk
Dummy
Mid Vulnerability to Wealth Risk
Dummy
Low Vulnerability to Wealth Risk
Dummy
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Evaluation

Dummy

1=respondent working in Finance sector, 0
for otherwise
1=the dwelling city is Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, 0 for otherwise
1= have internet access at home, 0 for
otherwise
1= highly vulnerable, 0 for otherwise

Dummy

1= moderately vulnerable, 0 for otherwise

Dummy

1= not vulnerable, 0 for otherwise

Dummy

Panel B: Dwelling and work status
I. Dwelling City Class
Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource

1st Class City Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent dwelling in
any one of the major cities.

Dummy

CUHS

2nd Class City Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent dwelling in
any one of the second class cities.

Dummy

CUHS

3rd Class City Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent dwelling in
any one of the third class cities.

Dummy

CUHS

4th Class City Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent dwelling in
any one of the fourth class cities.

Dummy

CUHS

5th Class City Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent dwelling in
any one of the fifth class cities.

Dummy

CUHS

6th Class City Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent dwelling in
any one of the sixth class cities.

Dummy

CUHS

16

Major cities (18): municipalities directly under the Central Government, special administration region, cities

with GDP higher than RMB 160 billion and population larger than 2 millions, including Beijing, Tianjin,
Chongqing, Hong Kong, Macau, Shenyang, Shanghai, Wuhan, Shenzhen, etc.
17 Second class cities (25): other cities of vice-province level, special economic zones, capitals of provinces,
including Shijiazhuang, Changchun, Zhengzhou, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changsha, Lanzhou, etc
18 Third class cities (24): 14 open coastal cities, high income cities, including Tangshan, Yantai, Xuzhou,
Zhenjiang, Wenzhou, Dongguan, Beihai, Guilin, etc.
19 Fourth class cities (18): other cities with population larger than 1 million, cities with important economic
status, including Handan, Anshan, Daqing, Yangzhou, Chaozhou, Liuzhou, etc.
20

Fifth class cities (23): other famous cities, important transportation junctions, cities with population larger than

half million, important travel cities, including Chengde, Baoding, Kaifeng, Huangshan, Jiujiang, Yan-an, etc.
21 Sixth class cities: all other cities.
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16

17

18

19

20

21

II. Dwelling Broad Regions
Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource

Beijing Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent
dwelling in Beijing.

Dummy

CUHS

Coastal Region Dweller
Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent
dwelling in the coastal region.

Dummy

CUHS

Central Region Dweller
Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent
dwelling in the central region.

Dummy

CHUS

Northeast Region
Dweller Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent
dwelling in the northeast region.

Dummy

CHUS

West Region Dweller
Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent
dwelling in the west region.

Dummy

22

23

24

25

CHUS

III. Employment status
Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource

Public Sector Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent
work in state-own unit

Dummy

CHUS

Joint-owned Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent
work in joint-own unit

Dummy

CHUS

Entrepreneur Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent is
private-own unit

Dummy

CHUS

22 Beijing is divided as a separate province, and serves as reference group for provinces district dummies.
23 Coastal Region Dweller provinces include Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong.
24 Central provinces include Anhui, Hubei, and Hunan.
25 Northeast provinces include Jilin and Heilongjiang.
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IV. Work Industry/ Sector
Variable Name

Description

Type

Evaluation

Full-time employee
Dummy

An indicator for whether the
respondent is working labor

Dummy

1=full-time employee,
0 for unemployed or
nonlabor

First Industry Dummy

An indicator for whether the
respondent is employed in the
first industry

Dummy

1=Agriculture,
Forestry, Animal
husbandry and
Fisheries, 0 for
otherwise

Second industry
Dummy

An indicator for whether the
respondent is employed in the
second industry

Dummy

1=Mining，
Manufacturing，
Production, Supply of
electricity, gas and
water, and
Construction, 0 for
otherwise

Third industry Dummy

An indicator for whether the
respondent is employed in the
third industry

Dummy

1=All the other
industries, 0 for
otherwise

Finance Sector Dummy

An indicator for whether the
respondent is employed in the
first industry

Dummy

1=Finance sector, 0 for
otherwise

V. Job Position/ Occupation
Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource

Manager Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent is
working in a manager position

Dummy

CHUS

Professional Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent is
working in a professional position

Dummy

CHUS

Clerk Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent is
working in a clerk position

Dummy

CHUS

Service occupation
Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent's
occupation is service-class worker

Dummy

CHUS

Farmer occupation
Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent's
occupation is farmer

Dummy

CHUS

Operator occupation
Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent's
occupation is operator

Dummy

CHUS

Armyman occupation
Dummy

An indicator for whether the respondent's
occupation is armyman

Dummy

CHUS
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Panel C: Preference, Attitudes, Belief and Behavioral Bias
Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource/ Calculation

Discrete with 3
unique values
Discrete with 3
unique values
Discrete with 3
unique values
Discrete with 3
unique values
Dummy

Appendix1 Q2

I. Proxy for Preferences and attitudes
Self-reported propensity of choose
in risk-return pairs
High Risk Tolerance An indicator whether risk
tolerance is high
Dummy
Mid Risk Tolerance An indicator whether risk
tolerance is moderate
Dummy
Low Risk Tolerance An indicator whether risk
tolerance is low
Dummy
An indicator whether the
Gamble Dummy
respondent ever buy lottery
Self-reported propensity to
Propensity to
Consume
Consume
Risk Tolerance

Discrete with 5
unique values

Risk Tolerance=2
Risk Tolerance=1
Risk Tolerance=0
1=ever buy lottery, 0
for otherwise
CFS

II. Proxy for investment behavior (biases/ mistakes)

Stock-owner Dummy

An indicator whether the
respondent invest equity

Dummy

1=present
stockholding value is
positive or report
HPR 1 or HPR 2 , 0 for
otherwise

Under-diversification The extent to which the stock
portfolio of the respondent is
under-diversified.

Discrete

Product of the
number of stocks in
the respondent’s
equity portfolio and
(-1).

Disposition Effect

Discrete with 3
unique values

Appendix1 Q3

Respondent’s propensity to hold
losers even when the prospect of
stock price is not good

III. Investors’ evaluation on the importance of information resource
Personal Experience
Preference

Importance of personal past
investment experience for
investment decision making

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q1

Own Analysis
Preference

Importance of own analysis by
self for investment decision
making

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q1

Consultant Advice
Preference

Importance of consultants’
opinion for investment decision
making

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q1

Peer Opinion
Preference

Importance of family’s and
friends’ opinion for investment
decision making

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q1
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Grapevine News
Preference

Importance of grapevine news for Discrete with 5
investment decision making
unique values

Appendix1 Q1

Confidence

An indicator whether a respondent Dummy
prefer to listen to himself/ herself

1= the highest score
among all the 5 types
of information
resource is either
Personal Experience
or Own Analysis; 0
for otherwise

IV. Satisfaction
Satisfaction on Life Satisfaction level on life overall

Discrete with 10 Appendix1 Q11
unique values

Overall

Satisfaction level on job overall

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1

Q12-9

Pay

Satisfaction level on pay of
current job

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1

Q12-1

Hours of work

Satisfaction level on hours of
work

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1

Q12-2

Relationship with
Co-workers

Satisfaction level on interpersonal Discrete with 5
relationship between co-workers unique values

Appendix1

Q12-4

Fringe Benefits

Satisfaction level on job fringe
benefit

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1

Q12-6

Job Stability

Satisfaction level on Job Stability Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1

Q12-7

Job Security

Satisfaction level on Job Security Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1

Q12-8

V. Belief
Optimism on
Economy

The extent the respondent feel
optimistic about the future economy

Optimistic
Expectation
Dummy

An indicator whether the respondent Dummy
feel very optimistic about the future
economy

Optimism on
Economy take the
highest value

Pessimistic
Expectation
Dummy

An indicator whether the respondent Dummy
feel very pessimistic about the future
economy

Optimism on
Economy take the
lowest value
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Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q9-7

Optimism on
Society

The extent the respondent feel
positive about future social
development

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q9-8

Panel D: Measures for individual stock investment return performance (IP)
Variable Name
HPR 1

HPR 2

AR 1
AR 2

Loser 1

Loser 2

Description

Type

Holding Period return rate
during the 6 months period
from April to September in
2009
Holding Period return rate
during the 36 months period
from October 2006 to
September 2009
Annualized return rate during
the 6 months period from
April to September in 2009
Annualized return rate during
the 36 months period from
October 2006 to September
2009
A indicator whether an
investor lost money in the 6
months period from April to
September in 2009
A indicator whether an
investor lost money in the 36
months period from October
2006 to September 2009

Resource/ Evaluation

Percent,
[-95,300]

Self-reported paper return
rate. Those lower than -100
are dropped.

Percent,
[-95,500]

Self-reported paper return
rate, not realized. Those lower
than -100 are dropped.

Percent,
[-99.75, 1500]

Annualized based on HPR 1

Percent,
[-63.16, 81.71]

Annualized based on HPR 2

Dummy

Loser 1 =1 if HPR 1 <0, zero
otherwise

Dummy

Loser 2 =1 if HPR 2 <0, zero
otherwise
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Panel E. Variables related to Global Financial Crisis
I. Impacts resulted from Global Financial Crisis
Variable

Description

Type

Resource

FC_Assets

To what extent GFC made
changes to respondent's assets

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q10-1

FC_Salary_income

To what extent GFC made
changes to respondent's real
income

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q10-2

FC_Job_stability

To what extent GFC made
changes to respondent's job
security

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q10-3

FC_Work_pressure

To what extent GFC made
changes to respondent's work
pressure experience

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q10-4

II. Importance rating on considerations when respondent assesses impacts of the
Globe Finance Crisis
Variable

Description

Type

Resource

Policy Consideration

Importance rating on
government stimulus package

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-1

Stock Price
Consideration

Importance rating on stock price

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-2

CPI Consideration

Importance rating on consumer
price indexes

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-3

IR Consideration

Importance rating on bank
interest rate

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-4

Export Consideration

Importance rating on decline in
export

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-5

GDP Consideration

Importance rating on GDP
growth rate

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-6

Employment
Consideration

Importance rating on
employment rate

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-7

Bankruptcy
Consideration

Importance rating on Company
closing down/bankrupt

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-8

Layoff Consideration

Importance rating on layoff
workers

Discrete variable with
5 unique values

Appendix1
Q8-9
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Panel F: Variables correlated to anxiety
I. Proxy for anxiety
Variable Name

Description

Type

Resource/ Evaluation

SA (State anxiety Degree to which
specific on GFC) investor feel anxious on
the Global Financial
Crisis

Discrete variable
with 17 unique
values, [1,5]

The scale formed from the four
variables measuring
respondents’ uneasy, nervous,
worry and fear feeling on GFC
using Cronbach’s alpha
computing.

TA (Trait anxiety) Individual’s intrinsic
propensity to feel
anxious, conceptually
close to the Psychology
term Trait Anxiety

Continuous
variable,[-2.63,
2.43]

Residual of the regression of SA
on impacts caused by GFC and
a variety of environmental
variables

HTA (High Trait
Anxiety Dummy)

An indicator for whether Dummy
an individual’s TA score
is relatively high among
sample respondents’,
with stereotype as an
emotionally nervy
person.

High Trait Anxiety Dummy=1 if
TA is one standard deviation
or more higher than mean, zero
otherwise

LTA(Low Trait
Anxiety Dummy)

An indicator for whether Dummy
an individual’s TA score
is relatively low among
sample respondents’,
with stereotype as an
emotionally stable
person.

Low Trait Anxiety Dummy=1 if
TA is one standard deviation
or more lower than mean, zero
otherwise

MTA (Middle
Trait Anxiety
Dummy)

An indicator for whether Dummy
an individual’s TA score
is in middle of those of
HTA and LTA.

Middle Trait Anxiety Dummy=1
if TA is within one standard
deviation to mean, zero
otherwise
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II. Variables related to Neuroticism
Resource/
Description

Type/value

Calculation

Psychological
Well-being

The extent to which GFC made
change to psychological well-being

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1
Q10-6

Emotional
Fluctuation

The extent to which investment
results affect mood

Discrete with 3
unique values

Appendix1
Q6

Own Analysis

Importance of personal analysis by
self for investment decision making

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q1

Consultant Advice

Importance of consultants’ opinion
for investment decision making

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q1

Grapevine News

Importance of grapevine news for
investment decision making

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q1

Satisfaction on Life Satisfaction level on life overall

Discrete with 10
unique values

Appendix1 Q11

Overall

Satisfaction level on job overall

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1
Q12-9

Pay

Satisfaction level on pay of current
job

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1
Q12-1

Hours of Work

Satisfaction level on hours of work

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1
Q12-2

Relationship with
Co-workers

Satisfaction level on interpersonal
relationship between co-workers

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1
Q12-4

Fringe Benefits

Satisfaction level on job fringe
benefit

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1
Q12-6

Job Stability

Satisfaction level on Job Stability

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1
Q12-7

Job Security

Satisfaction level on Job Security

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1
Q12-8

Optimism on
Economy

The extent the respondent feel
optimistic about the future economy

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q9-7

Optimism on
Society

The extent the respondent feel
positive about future social
development

Discrete with 5
unique values

Appendix1 Q9-8

Variable
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Appendix 4. Index of stock markets in China at special dates during
the global financial crisis
SSE composite A share

SHE composite A share

Sept.1, 2006

1636.691

415.631

Oct. 12, 2007

5903.264

1517.631

Oct. 31, 2008

1728.786

470.911

March 6, 2009

2193.007

715.005

Sept. 4, 2009

2861.609

968.545
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Appendix 5. A summary on determinants of stock ownership
1.Financial Characteristics
Effect on
stockownership

Determinant

Wealth and Income

Background risk

2.Demographic
Determinant

Evidence

strong positive

Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2003);
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991);
Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003)

negative

Bertaut and Haliassos (1995); Campbell
(2006); Edwards (2008); Rosen and Wu
(2004); Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio
(2003)

Characteristics
Effect on
stockownership

Evidence
Bernheim and Garrett (2003); Campbell
(2006); Cole and Shastry (2009);
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995); Van
Rooji, Lusardi and Alessi (2007)

Education

strong positive

Age

hump-shape pattern Ameriks and Zeldes (2004)

Gender

No uniform
conclusion

Barber and Odean (2001); Jianakoplos
and Bernasek (1998); Sundén and
Surette (1998)

Marital status

positive

Love (2010)
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3.Innate preference
Effect on
stockownership

Determinant

Evidence

Risk aversion

strong negative

Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2003);
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998);
Sundén and Surette (1998);
Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003)

Gambling

Some gamble in
stock market
instead rationally
invest

Kumar (2009)

Trust

positive

Sociability

positive

Personal values

depends

Georgarakos and Pasini (2011); Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2008)
Brown, Ivković, Smith, and Weisbenner
(2008); Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004);
Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012)
Kaustia and Torstila (2011)

4.Knowledge and ability

Financial literacy

Effect on
stockownership
positive

Awareness

positive

IQ

positive

Cognitive abilities

positive

Determinant

Evidence
Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011)
Guiso and Jappelli (2005)
Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa
(2011)
Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2005);
Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2010);
Cole and Shastry (2009); Dohmen, Falk,
Huffman , Sunde, Schupp and Wagner
(2011); Korniotis and Kumar (2011)
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5.External Environment
Determinant

Effect on
stockownership

Social and Cultural
depends
influence

Peer performance

positive

Evidence
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001a);
Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008); Shefrin
and Statman (2000); Shiller (1984);
Stulz and Williamson (2003)
Brown Ivković, Smith, and Weisbenner
(2008); Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004);
Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012)

6.Others
Expectation

depends

Mistake

negative

Bonaparte and Fabozzi (2011)
Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009a);
Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009b);
Campbell (2006); Campbell, Jackson,
Madrian, and Tufano (2011); Haliassos
and Bertaut (1995)
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